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Abstract 
In this article, we analyse four different dimensions of socio-economic integration of first and second 
generation immigrants into the labour markets of 13 EU countries and we assess, taking into account a 
number of individual characteristics, the effects of the countries of origin and the countries of 
destination on this integration. We find that participation in the labour market, unemployment, 
occupational status and the chances of reaching the upper middle-class are different, although inter-
related, dimensions of the socio-economic integration of immigrants and they work differently for men 
and women. In the countries of destination, the level of employment protection legislation and the 
conservative welfare regime affect this integration negatively. Most indicators of national policies 
aimed at the integration of immigrants have no effects on the socio-economic integration of 
immigrants. Furthermore, we find a number of origin effects which continue to have an impact on 
second generation immigrants. Political stability and political freedom in origin countries have 
positive and negative effects on socio-economic integration. The emigration rate of the origin 
countries has a negative effect. The higher levels of socio-economic integration amongst immigrants 
from other EU-countries demonstrates the functioning of the European Union as an integrated labour 
market .Controlling for individual religious affiliation turns out to be very useful, since we find a 
number of negative effects of being a Muslim, among both men and women. While individual 
education is an important predictor of immigrants’ labour market outcomes, our findings indicate 
lower returns on this education in terms of occupational status, indicating a ceiling effect for highly-
educated second generation immigrants who cannot translate their qualifications into high-status jobs 
to the same extent as their native peers.  
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Immigrant integration has received lots of attention in social scientific research, but this has been 
concentrated on the ‘classical’ immigration countries, most notably the U.S. There, starting with the 
work of the Chicago School, a theory of assimilation developed according to which it was expected 
that immigrants would become more like natives over time socio-economically, spatially, socio-
culturally and politically. This process of linear assimilation was perceived to occur over the life-
course of first generation immigrants and reach near perfection in the second generation, thought to 
experience largely the same living conditions as their peers born of native parents. However, later 
waves of immigration from more diverse regions of origin led to a challenge to assimilation theory. 
Research among different ethnic groups in different urban settings in the U.S. revealed that not all 
immigrant groups experience upward social mobility after arrival. While this still holds true for some 
immigrant groups, others were found to face downward assimilation into a socio-economic, but also 
racially or ethnically defined, underclass, while still other groups were neither incorporated into the 
middle-class nor into the underclass, instead remaining concentrated in ethnic niches or enclaves. The 
debate as to whether there is still a general trend of assimilation for all groups or whether there is a 
process of segmented assimilation at work is still ongoing in the U.S. (Alba & Nee, 1997; Portes & 
Rumbaut, 2001; Zhou, 1997).  
In Europe, the debate about and research into the integration of immigrants is still much more 
recent, due to the fact that despite continuous population movements throughout the history of the 
continent and its shifting borders, most Western European countries have just started to acknowledge 
that they are currently immigration societies. Most Southern European countries, on the other hand, 
have shifted from being primarily emigrant sending to immigrant receiving societies over the past 30 
years. In addition, many European countries are characterized by strong regional divides, which 
sometimes go together with linguistic and/or ethnic cleavages within states, a factor that renders the 
integration of immigrants more complex since it is not always clear who the reference category for 
these newcomers is (Phalet & Kosic, 2005). Moreover, policy approaches to immigrant integration 
vary greatly between European societies which continue to define themselves as nation-states with 
heavy ethnic connotations. Germany, for instance, has only recently shifted its naturalization policy 
from a jus sanguinis to a jus solis principle, thus hoping to improve the chances of a successful 
integration of second generation immigrants who, before the reform, were still legally considered non-
nationals. France has followed the opposite approach with its policy of non-registration of ethnicity 
and its comparatively generous granting of citizenship to both foreign- and native-born populations. 
However, both countries and most of their fellow EU member-states are currently discussing, with the 
image of the youth riots in the French suburbs still fresh on their minds, whether, and if so, to what 
extent, the integration of immigrants has been successful in the past and how it can become more 
successful in the future. 
In light of this public debate and the European Union’s goal of defining a common immigration 
policy, there is a need for comparative research on the integration of immigrants across European 
societies in order to establish in which countries this integration has been most successful and to 
identify the policies or other macro-characteristics that enable such successful integration. To be more 
precise, we want to find out which characteristics, of both the countries of destination and the 
countries of origin, promote or hamper the integration of immigrants, taking into account their 
individual characteristics. In this study, we focus on the position of immigrants in the labour market, 
thus limiting our scope to the socio-economic dimension of integration. We do this not only for 
                                                      
*   This article is the result of a traineeship of the first author at the European University Institute, and is written within the 
context of the European Forum 2006/7 of the Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies of the EUI, directed by the 
second author. 
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practical reasons (our data provides the most information about this dimension of integration and 
covering more than one dimension is hardly feasible within one article), but also in agreement with a 
number of scholars who have argued that the socio-economic integration of immigrants is the first step 
and a precondition for spatial, socio-cultural and political integration (Geddes et al., 2004; 
Waldenrauch, 2001). 
In addition to the differences in policies and other characteristics between the countries of 
destination, it is expected that the countries of origin also affect immigrants’ socio-economic 
integration. As Kao and Thompson (2003) have argued, differences in religion and cultural values of 
immigrants lead to different evaluations of achievement, which can partly explain differential 
outcomes of immigrants coming from different regions of the world. Furthermore, the levels of 
expected and experienced discrimination in the labour market differ between immigrant groups from 
different origins, which might partly be due to different levels of ‘visibility’ of these immigrant 
groups. However, discrimination does not affect all immigrants in the same way: research into school 
performance in the U.S. has found that expected discrimination has a discouraging effect on African-
Americans (Ogbu, 1991), while providing an incentive for South-Asian Americans to perform even 
better (Sue & Okazaki, 1990). 
While research on immigrant integration in Europe is still limited in comparison to studies 
conducted in the classical immigrant receiving societies, there are already numerous studies 
comparing the processes and outcomes of integration between European countries. However, many of 
them are limited either to a small number of countries of destination or to a small number of 
immigrant groups (for a recent example, see Böcker & Thränhardt, 2007). Others try to incorporate a 
larger number of countries of destination, either by analyzing more countries separately (e.g. Heath & 
Cheung, 2007) or by comparing national statistics (e.g. Werner, 2003). There are several problems 
with this type of research. Obviously, separate analyses of different countries of destination do not 
allow for statistical testing across countries, so that the comparison remains on a more abstract, 
theoretical level. Moreover, the definition of who is an immigrant (and, to make things even more 
complicated, also the terminology) differs between countries, leaving some doubts as to the usefulness 
of comparing national statistical data from these various countries. A more serious problem, however, 
is that comparisons taking into account only one immigrant group in multiple destinations or multiple 
immigrant groups in one destination do not allow one to disentangle the effects of the country of 
destination and those of the country of origin on the integration of immigrants. This is a serious 
drawback, since the composition of immigrant populations varies greatly between European countries. 
Tables 1 and 2 clearly show the variation in the composition of immigrants, both in terms of their 
individual characteristics and their distribution across the various countries of origin, across the 
destination countries under study and in their labour market outcomes. In contrast to the cross-
classified multilevel analysis that we perform, a single comparative approach or a study including only 
a small number of countries of destination cannot establish whether these differential outcomes are 
due to factors at the individual level or due to macro-characteristics of the country of destination or the 
country of origin.  
Only few studies using such a double comparative multilevel approach have been published, but 
again, these have suffered from a number of shortcomings, mostly due to problems of data availability. 
Tubergen’s work (2004; Tubergen et al., 2004) on immigrant integration in numerous countries of 
destination does examine the effects of a number of macro-characteristics of both countries of 
destination and of origin, but his data only includes first generation immigrants. Although this research 
has been a great improvement on earlier work, the fact that it does not include the second generation is 
a serious drawback, since differences between recent arrivals and natives are to be expected and the 
integration of the first generation can only be studied from a dynamic, longitudinal perspective that 
assesses immigrants’ integration over their life-course. The fate of the second generation, on the other 
hand, is a much stronger indicator of the degree to which integration is successful. Furthermore, these 
studies do not exclusively focus on Europe and therefore do not allow for very detailed measures of 
intra-European differences in immigrant integration.  
Fenella Fleischmann and Jaap Dronkers
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Similar approaches have revealed significant effects of both country of destination, as well as 
country of origin, on the school achievement of immigrant pupils (Levels & Dronkers, in press; 
Levels, Dronkers & Kraaykamp, 2006). These studies made clear that both the sending and the 
receiving contexts affect immigrants’ socio-economic integration into the countries of destination, and 
they identified a number of macro-characteristics of both the countries of origin and the countries of 
destination, such as GDP per capita and religious composition, which affect pupils’ achievement.  
Kogan (2007) uses an exclusively European focus in her comparison of immigrants’ labour market 
outcomes in the EU-15 countries
1. She examines the effects of a number of macro-characteristics, 
especially welfare regimes and the structure of the labour market on immigrants’ position in these 
labour markets. However, her data does not contain information about the exact country of origin of 
immigrants, which implies that she cannot take into account characteristics of these countries and 
measure their effects on immigrant integration. In addition, her data also excludes second generation 
immigrants. A similar problem applies to the research of Dronkers and Wanner (2006) on income 
differentials between natives and immigrants which is based on data from the first wave of the 
European Social Survey, plus survey data from Canada and the U.S. Like Kogan, these authors 
aggregate immigrants into larger regions of origin (they distinguish between immigrants from the first 
world, second and third world and from former colonies), which makes it impossible to include 
macro-characteristics of the country of origin. 
The second wave of the European Social Survey allows us to overcome these problems, since it 
provides information about the country of birth of the respondent and of both of his or her parents, 
thus allowing first and second generations of immigrants to be distinguished and the country of origin 
to be specified in each case. In the following section, we elaborate on the micro-characteristics of 
individual immigrants and the macro-characteristics of the countries of origin and destination that we 
take into account in analyzing labour market outcomes of first and second generation immigrants 
across 13 EU countries. For both micro- and macro-characteristics we will formulate hypotheses, 
based on the current literature.  
2. Data and Measures 
We use the second wave of the European Social Survey (Jowell et al., 2005) which contains data, 
gathered in 2004 and 2005, from more than 45.000 respondents in 23 countries. The main aim of our 
article is to assess the impact of a number of social and labour market policies of destination countries 
on the integration of immigrants. We measure the inclusiveness of social policies with the European 
Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index and, unfortunately, at the time of writing this index was only 
available for the EU-15 countries. Since data from Italy was not yet available when we performed the 
analysis, we could only include 14 countries of destination. This number further decreased to 13 
because we excluded data from Finland given the low number of immigrant respondents in this 
country
2. Furthermore, we selected only respondents between the ages of 25 and 60 since this is the 
period in which most respondents will have completed their education and in which their economic 
activity is concentrated. Our final sample of 15602 respondents contains 2541 immigrants (1209 male 
and 1332 female) from 132 different countries of origin.  
                                                      
1   The EU-15 are those countries who were members of the European Union before the two most recent enlargements in 
2004 and 2007.  
2   There are only 25 respondents in the Finnish sample who can be properly classified as immigrants and can be assigned a 
country of origin. However, the refusal rate of the question in which country the respondent was born is significantly 
higher in Finland than in other survey countries, resulting in a large number of persons for whom we do not know 
whether they are immigrants or natives. Given the limited information about these respondents, we decided to exclude 
them from the sample which lowered the number of immigrants in Finland to an unacceptably small number.  
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We classified respondents as immigrants if one or both parents were born outside the country of 
destination. Respondents who were born abroad but to two native parents are not classified as 
immigrants because we assume that these children of expats will be more like the native population 
than children of mixed marriages and children of first generation immigrants. We used the following 
decision rules to establish the country of origin: if the respondent and both of his/her parents were 
born in the same country, this country was classified as the country of origin. If two out of three were 
born in the same country, this country was used, except if two out of three were natives. If all three 
were born in different countries, we looked at the language spoken at home. If this corresponded to 
any of the three possible countries, this country was used. If not, we used the country of birth of the 
mother, arguing that parental culture is more influential in socialization (rather than using the country 
of birth of the respondent, which can be a temporary coincidence, especially in the case of these more 
diverse family backgrounds) and that ‘motherhood is a fact, whereas fatherhood is an opinion’. With 
this procedure, we can distinguish 132 countries of origin, but many of them contain only few cases. 
We therefore aggregated countries into regions of origin whenever there were less than 20 immigrants 
from a certain country of origin using a slightly adapted version of the United Nations classification of 
geographical regions (United Nations Statistical Office)
3. In the end, we distinguish 27 countries of 
origin and an additional 21 regions of origin, varying in numbers of immigrants from 2 (French 
Speaking Caribbean) to 209 (Germany). Tables 1 and 2.b, which provide information about the 
dependent and independent variables per country/region of origin list these countries and regions 
according to the size of the immigrant group from this country in descending order. 
On the one hand, our measurement of immigrant status, which is based on information about the 
country of birth of respondents and of both of their parents, is much more accurate than taking only 
nationality (problematic due to differences in naturalization rates across countries and the colonial 
histories of many immigrants) or country of birth of the respondent (which excludes the second 
generation) into account (Kogan, 2007). On the other hand, it gives rise to a number of problems, 
which can be solved neither with the data sets used here, nor with other available cross-national data. 
A first definitional problem is related to changing national boundaries and is particularly relevant to 
Europe. Due to the changes in the political frontiers after 1945 (the annexation by Poland of some 
formerly German territory; the extension of Russia at the expense of Polish territory) and due to the 
subsequent displacement of large populations, an unknown number of ‘indigenous’ persons are 
measured as being born outside their country, e.g. a German respondent or his/her parents born in 
Königsberg (East Prussia) and now living in Germany or a Polish respondent or his/her parents born in 
Lvov (Ukraine) and now living in Poland. One can argue that by failing to make the distinction 
between genuine migrants and border changes, we overestimate the number of better-integrated 
immigrants. At the same time, this failure highlights a conceptual problem in defining an immigrant: 
for how many generations must a Polish family live in Germany before he/she is no longer considered 
Polish? This issue also extends to the large number of third country immigrants originating in former 
European colonies whose grandparents migrated to Europe. Their grandchildren, born in these 
immigrant receiving countries, are measured as native born. However, typically in these countries this 
third generation will continue to be considered “immigrants”, especially if they are a ‘visible 
minority’. Therefore they might still have lower levels of education and labour market outcomes than 
natives within these countries (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001).  
                                                      
3   The adaptations that we made all refer to the Caribbean and the Americas. Here, we did not stick with the strictly 
geographic distinction that is made by the United Nations, but included information about national languages. In this 
way, we constructed the new category ‘Caribbean and South America’ with the subcategories ‘Spanish Speaking’, 
‘English Speaking’, ‘French Speaking’ and ‘Dutch Speaking’ (due to a sufficient number of immigrants from Brazil, 
there is no separate category of ‘Portuguese Speaking’). This deviation from the general classification scheme of the UN 
is justified, in the authors’ view, by the different migration patterns that go along with the different colonial histories 
which materialize in the languages that are spoken in these regions today. 
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Given the sampling procedures applied in constructing the data set used here, our data is unlikely to 
include illegal immigrants, although illegal immigrants are prominent in the popular images of 
immigrants in highly developed countries, particularly North and Sub Saharan Africans arriving on the 
Italian island of Lampedusa from Libya or landing on the beaches of southern Spain and the Canary 
Islands. These illegal immigrants are also important in the labour markets of developed countries, 
although less visible at the bottom and most vulnerable. One can argue that by failing to include illegal 
immigrants in surveys, we overestimate the integration of immigrants. Therefore our results should be 
seen as an indication of the labour market attainments of official immigrants or of those illegal 
immigrants who have become official by means of such mechanisms as loopholes in the law, general 
pardons, marriage, or fraud. 
2.1. Dependent variables 
We concentrate our analysis of the socio-economic integration of immigrants on their success in the 
labour market. Four indicators are used to assess different dimensions of this success or failure. First 
of all, we analyze the economic activity of immigrants and answer the question whether their labour 
market participation rates differ from those of natives. The dichotomous variable economic activity 
includes all respondents who have paid work, be it as employees or as self-employed workers and 
those who are unemployed and actively searching for a job. Once immigrants enter the labour market, 
we want to know how successful they are in avoiding unemployment. We classify those respondents 
as unemployed who are active in the labour market, but not currently employed. Thirdly, for those 
respondents who succeed in finding paid work, we examine the occupational status of their current 
job, using the ISEI-scale
4 (Ganzeboom et al., 1992). Given the disputed continuous character of this 
occupational status scale and the lower chances of second generation immigrants of entering the 
highest occupational class than comparable natives (Tesser & Dronkers, 2007), we also need to 
analyse more specific barriers within the structure of the labour market. We therefore examine 
whether respondents succeed in entering the upper middle-class, which we define as those occupations 
classified as higher and lower controllers in the EGP class categories scheme (Erikson et al., 1979). 
Table 1 presents an overview of the dependent variables in our analyses for natives and immigrants 
per country of destination and country/region of origin. In these tables, we present the average 
outcomes for men and women together, but we separate men and women in the analysis in order to 
take into account the various interactions that are expected to occur. The occupational status variable 
had 977 missing values, 812 of which were among immigrants. In order to avoid loss of information 
due to listwise deletion, we imputed missing values for the ISEI-scale using a regression procedure in 
which we took into account the immigrant generation, the country of origin, the highest educational 
level achieved and the respondent’s gender.  
2.2. Independent variables: individual characteristics 
Since the process of socio-economic assimilation of immigrants is expected to differ between different 
generations of immigrants, we distinguish two such generations. First generation immigrants are those 
who were born outside the country of destination. This group makes up 59.1% of all immigrants in our 
sample. Second generation immigrants are those who are born in the country of destination, but who 
have at least one parent who was born outside the country of destination. This group comprises 40.9% 
of our immigrant sample
5. If socio-economic assimilation of immigrants in European societies occurs, 
                                                      
4   The European Social Survey assesses occupational status using the 4-digit ISCO-88 scale. Although in general, the 
diverse measures of occupational status are highly correlated (Bakker & Blees-Booij, 1995), we decided to recode the 
original variable into the more comprehensive and more widely used ISEI-scale. 
5   We also tried to include the so-called ‘1.5-generation’, which consists of individuals who were born outside the country 
of destination, but who migrated at such a young age that they received most or all of their education in the destination 
country. A problem in the construction of this category is that the European Social Survey does not provide exact 
The Effects of Social and Labour Market Policies of EU-countries on Socio-Economic Integration of First and Second Generation Immigrants
EUI-WP RSCAS 2007/19 © 2007 Fenella Fleischmann and Jaap Dronkers                                                 5 
 
the second generation should have more favourable labour market outcomes than the first generation 
of immigrants.  
Access to and success in the labour market depend, to a large extent, on educational qualifications. 
Therefore an important individual characteristic to take into account is the highest level of education 
achieved by the respondent. The European Social Survey provides an internationally comparable 
measure of this indicator, using the 7-point ISCED-97 (UNESCO, 1997) scale which ranges from 0 
(not completed primary education) to 6 (second stage of tertiary education). However, due to a 
different measurement in the UK, we had to collapse the categories ‘upper secondary’ and ‘post-
secondary, non-tertiary’ and the categories ‘first stage of tertiary’ and ‘second stage of tertiary’. This 
recoding restricts us to a less precise 5-point scale, but is considered the lesser evil by the authors. The 
alternative would have been to exclude all data from the United Kingdom, which is not desirable given 
the importance of this country for comparative research on immigration in Europe and, in addition, 
because of the resulting reduction in the N at the highest level. We also take into account the age of 
the respondent (linear and quadratic terms
6), the number of children he/she has and the highest 
educational level achieved by his/her parents. The latter measure is computed by taking the maximum 
of the educational level variable of both parents. These are measured with the same ISCED scale and, 
since there are no country-specific deviations, we keep the original scale, but we remind the reader 
that the measures of educational level differ between respondents and their parents. We imputed 
missing values for the highest level of education of the respondent (1146, 211 of which are among 
immigrants) and his/her parents (556 missing values, 135 of which among immigrants), using the 
mean of groups sorted according to gender, immigrant status, immigrant generation and country of 
origin in the case of respondent’s education and immigrant status, country of origin and respondent’s 
education in the case of parents’ education. We add (stepwise) dichotomous variables which indicate 
whether these variables are imputed whenever we use the education variables, in order to control for 
the effect of imputation. We expect that the higher the respondents’ education and the higher the 
education of their parents, the better integrated they are socio-economically. With regard to age, we 
hypothesize that, in general, older immigrants will be better integrated than younger immigrants, but 
we do not expect this relation to be linear. It is likely that the age benefit, if it exists, levels off or even 
turns into a penalty from a certain age on, most likely a few years before retirement.  
With regard to the number of children, we expect effects to differ strongly between men and 
women: while higher numbers of children are likely to reduce female labour market participation and, 
eventually their occupational status, they might enhance the labour market participation of men, as 
well as their status. The latter effect is expected both because fathers are under more pressure to 
provide an income than their childless peers and because employers favour employees who are 
married and who have a family due to an expected higher loyalty and efficiency in their work.  
Furthermore, we include respondents’ religion in this step of the analysis. We use dummies that 
indicate the religious group the respondent belongs to
7. In addition, we assess religiosity with a self-
classification measure where respondents indicated their degree of religiosity on a 10-point scale 
ranging from ‘not religious at all’ to ‘very religious’. Lastly, we control for the intensity of religious 
practice which we assess with a composite measure that includes the answers to the questions ‘How 
(Contd.)                                                                   
information about the time since migration, since this is measured categorically. Using the maximum of the categories in 
the survey (which systematically underestimates the age at migration) and selecting all immigrants who had migrated 
before the age of 14 based on this calculation resulted in a share of 10.8% of all immigrants constituting the 1.5 
generation. In light of this small share despite very generous definition, we refrained from analyzing this group of 
immigrants separately.  
6   Where the quadratic terms of age were significant, we tested whether higher order effects of age occurred, but found no 
significant results.  
7   In the multilevel analysis, we use Christians (including Eastern-Orthodox) as a reference category and show the effects of 
having no religion or being a Muslim. The numbers of affiliates of other religions were too low to be included in the 
analysis. 
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often do you attend religious services, apart from special occasions?’ and ‘How often do you pray 
apart from during services?’. Both questions were answered on a 7-point scale that we reversed so that 
higher values indicate a higher intensity of religious practice. Including individual religion is not 
common in the analysis of socio-economic integration of immigrants, but we have two reasons to 
expect effects in this respect: firstly, the cultural habitus of a religious group might affect labour 
market outcomes, for example through the differential evaluation of achievement (Kao & Thompson, 
2003). Secondly, European societies react differently to different religious groups, the primary 
example being the approach towards Muslims after 9/11. We therefore hypothesize that religious 
affiliation and the extent to which individuals follow the practices of their religious community will 
affect their socio-economic integration, but we do not have clear expectations with regard to the signs 
of the effects for different religious groups.  
In the multilevel analyses, which are based exclusively on the immigrant sample, we additionally 
take into account whether respondents speak a minority language at home, whether they hold the 
citizenship of the country of destination and whether they are born to one native and one immigrant 
parent. Based on earlier findings (Levels & Dronkers, 2005), we hypothesize that immigrants who 
speak a minority language at home will have less favourable labour market outcomes. On the 
contrary,  we expect immigrants who are citizens of their destination country and those second 
generation migrants who are born to one native and one immigrant parent to have higher levels of 
socio-economic integration. 
We argue that immigrants from certain countries of origin are likely to be better integrated socio-
economically than immigrants from other countries or regions of origin. Therefore, we coded the 
information according to whether the country of origin is a neighbouring country of the country of 
destination
8, whether the country of origin is one of the EU-15 member states (plus the largely 
comparable countries and silent EU member-states, Switzerland and Norway) and whether the country 
of origin is a former colony or territory of the country of destination.
9 We expect immigrants from 
countries which are part of any of these categories to be better integrated socio-economically than 
immigrants  who come from countries which are less historically and culturally connected to the 
countries of destination in our analysis.  
2.3. Independent variables: macro-characteristics  
The main focus of our paper is the question whether, and if so how, indicators on the macro-level, 
both of the countries of destination and the countries of origin, affect immigrants’ socio-economic 
integration in the 13 EU countries under study.  
With regard to the countries of destination, we use indicators of the policies geared towards 
immigrant integration, the type of welfare regime, Employment Protection Legislation (EPL), the size 
of the bottom of the labour market, GNI per capita, GINI coefficient, the presence of left-wing parties 
in government and the net migration rate. As a measure of immigrant integration policies, we use the 
European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index (Geddes et al., 2004) which has recently been 
developed for the EU-15 member states. This index contains five dimensions: labour market inclusion, 
long term residence rights, family reunion, naturalization and anti-discrimination measures. We 
recoded index scores so that values between -1 and 0 represent less favourable policies on these 
dimensions, while values between 0 and 1 stand for more favourable policies, i.e. policies that are 
                                                      
8   We use a liberal definition of neighbouring countries which also includes countries who share sea borders with the 
country of destination. A list of the matches of neighbouring countries is provided in the appendix. 
9   These are, in the first place, countries that have been or still are colonies (for instance India for the UK, the Spanish-
speaking countries of Latin America for Spain, and Brazil for Portugal). But in the case of Austria, Germany, the UK and 
Sweden they also included those countries that were a part of their former territories (for example Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, and the former Yugoslavia for Austria; Norway for Sweden).  
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more inclusive of immigrants. The assessment of each country’s policies in these areas is based on an 
ideal, not real, legal framework, which means that the creators of the index made a judgement as to 
how close certain national policies came to what they consider to be ideal for the integration of 
immigrants. Next to the five separate dimensions, we include the (unweighted) mean score across 
these dimensions. We test the hypothesis that immigrants in countries with a higher score on (one of 
the dimensions of) the European Inclusion Index are better integrated socio-economically than in 
countries which score low on this Index.  
Furthermore, we test the effects of different types of welfare regimes of the countries of 
destination. Based on the classic typology of Esping-Andersen (1990) and the work of other authors 
(Kogan, 2007), we distinguish between the liberal welfare regime, represented by the United Kingdom 
and Ireland in our data, which is characterized by market-based social insurance and a lack of active 
employment measures. The social-democratic welfare regime (represented by Sweden and Denmark in 
our analysis), which, on the contrary, is characterized by a high standard of universal social insurance 
for citizens with a strong equalizing objective. In conservative welfare regimes, social insurance is 
state-based instead of market-based, but, in contrast to the social-democratic welfare regime, there is 
no aim of equalization of status and class differentials. We classify Belgium, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands as countries with conservative welfare regimes. We furthermore 
distinguish the Southern or Mediterranean welfare regime which is found in Greece, Portugal and 
Spain, and which shares some commonalities with the conservative welfare regime, but additionally 
knows a high level of labour market rigidity and rather low levels of welfare benefits (for a more 
detailed description of the different types of welfare regimes, we refer to Kogan, 2007 and Esping-
Andersen, 1990). Following Kogan (2007), who found a positive effect of the liberal welfare state on 
immigrants’ socio-economic integration, we argue that the type of welfare regime should be taken into 
account when analysing between-country differences in immigrant integration in the labour market. 
We expect that the liberal welfare regime has a less closed labour market and social welfare system 
for outsiders and, as a consequence, increases immigrants’ opportunities for a successful socio-
economic integration. 
Labour market rigidity might even be more relevant to employment opportunities and ensuing 
occupational status of immigrants, since more stringent Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) is 
likely to increase the effects of statistical discrimination and the penalty of an outsider status in the 
labour market that immigrants are likely to experience (Kogan, 2007). EPL data are taken from the 
OECD’s labour market statistics (OECD, 2006). We averaged the available scores from 1990, 1998 
and 2003 in order to reach a maximally reliable measure of labour market rigidity. In our data, EPL 
ranges between 0.65 in the United Kingdom to 3.33 in Greece. We expect immigrants to be better 
integrated socio-economically in countries with a more flexible labour market, i.e., in countries with 
lower scores on Employment Protection Legislation. 
In the same vein, we take into account the size of the bottom of the labour market, defined as the 
percentage of the employed population that works in an occupation with a status of 30 or lower on the 
ISEI-scale (see also Kogan, 2007). We have mixed expectations regarding the effect of this indicator: 
on the one hand, a larger low-status segment will probably make it easier for immigrants to be active in 
the labour market. However, it might at the same time restrict their advancement to higher-status jobs. 
We additionally control for the presence of left-wing parties in the government during the past 30 
years. Based on the data provided by Beck et al. (2001), we compute a total score for every country 
assigning a 1 for every year in which the government is exclusively made up of left-wing parties and 
0.5 for every year in which a left-wing party takes part in a coalition with one or more centre or right-
wing parties. This measure has been used in previous cross-country research on immigrant integration 
(Tubergen, 2004; Tubergen et al., 2004), but the problem with this indicator is that it is merely a proxy 
for concrete policies. In the presence of the policy indicators described above, we expect little 
additional explanatory power of the presence of left-wing parties in the government. The general 
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expectation is that the presence of left-wing parties in the government promotes the socio-economic 
integration of immigrants.  
Furthermore, we control for GDP per capita (expressed in purchasing power parity) and the GINI-
coefficient of both destination and origin countries. These measures are perceived to be internationally 
comparable indicators of the economic situation of a country and the degree of (in-)equality of the 
distribution of wealth within countries. GDP per capita was taken from the CIA World Factbook 
(2007), which also provides the GINI-coefficient for a number of countries. However, since this 
source does not cover all countries in our data-set, we used data from the World Bank where these 
were available. In contrast to the World Factbook which provides the most recent calculation of the 
GINI-coefficient, the World Bank lists a number of values for different years for most countries. In 
order to make maximal use of the available information, we calculated the average GINI-coefficient 
per country across all available measurement points. However, we did not succeed in finding any 
information about the GINI-coefficient for 20 countries of origin
10. We also used information about 
the net migration rate of both countries of destination and origin; this data was again taken from the 
CIA World Factbook which means that it provides the most recent indication. We expect that 
immigrants who come from countries in which these indicators differ only slightly from their countries 
of destination will be better integrated socio-economically
11. 
For countries of origin, we also include Kaufmann et al.’s (2005) indicator of political stability 
which assesses the probability that the current government will be overthrown in the near future. This 
measure, which is internationally comparable and ranges between -2.5 and + 2.5 due to a 
standardization procedure, is available for all countries of destination and origin, with the exception of 
the Faroe Islands, Greenland and Yugoslavia. Furthermore, we include an index of political freedom 
and civil rights developed and published for the last 30 years by Freedom House (2006). We recode 
this 7-point index so that higher values represent higher rates of political freedom. By including these 
indicators of the political structure of the countries of origin, we hope to distinguish between economic 
and political immigrants. Because of the political background of their migration, we expect political 
refugees to have a stronger bond with their country of origin since they might hope to return to this 
country after a regime change. We expect immigrants from politically less stable and less free 
countries to be less well integrated into the labour markets of the countries of destination.  
As a more comprehensive measure of the economic and social development of countries of origin, 
we use the scale of the 2006 Human Development Index. This index combines information on GDP 
per capita, education, life expectancy and gender inequality and ranks countries according to these 
                                                      
10  These are the United Arab Emirates, Afghanistan, Netherlands Antilles, Angola, Aruba, Benin, Brunei, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Cape Verde, Eritrea, Faroe Islands, Greenland, Haiti, Iceland, Saint Lucia, Libya, Martinique, the 
Palestinian Territories, Somalia and Syria. Countries of origin with no more than 2 immigrants in our sample were 
deleted listwise if they had missing values on any of the macro-characteristics. For a number of countries, however, we 
imputed these values in order to reduce loss of information. For the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, we used the mean of 
the scores of the Netherlands and Suriname, for Angola we used Mozambique, for the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
we used the mean of the neighbouring countries, for Cape Verde we used the mean of Portugal and Senegal, for the Faroe 
Islands and Iceland we used Denmark, for Libya we used Egypt and Tunisia, for Syria we used Lebanon, Jordan and 
Turkey, for Serbia and Montenegro we used Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and for Yugoslavia we used the mean of its 
successor states. 
11  Most of our macro-indicators are measured at only one, fairly recent, time-point. This is not ideal, since a thorough test of 
our arguments would imply measuring the difference in these macro-indicators between the country of origin and the 
country of destination at the moment of migration. However, such an accurate measurement is not feasible with the data 
at hand since they do not specify the time of migration. Furthermore, it is unlikely that all indicators will be available for 
all the required years, especially taking into account that our sample includes second generation immigrants up to the age 
of 60, which means that the migration of their parents might have occurred in the early 20th century and at a time when 
national boundaries were quite different from nowadays. 
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indicators. Unfortunately, there are also missing values on this indicator for 9 countries of origin
12. We 
expect immigrants from less developed countries (i.e. those with a higher Index-score) to have lower 
levels of socio-economic integration due to the larger economic and cultural differences between their 
countries of origin and of destination. 
Lastly, we include a dummy variable for the prevalent religion in the country of origin. A religion 
was classified to prevail in one country if at least 50% of the population belonged to this religious 
group (based again on information from the CIA World Factbook); if necessary, different Christian 
denominations were aggregated in this procedure and a country was classified ‘prevalently Christian’ 
if more than 50% of the population belonged to any Christian denomination. If less than 50% of the 
population belonged to a single religious group, the country was classified as having no prevalent 
religion. The prevalent religion in the country of origin is an indicator of the cultural distance between 
the country of origin and the country of destination which has been used in comparable research 
(Tubergen, 2004, Tubergen et al., 2004). Due to the larger cultural distance, we expect immigrants 
from non-Christian countries to have less favourable labour market outcomes in the 13 EU countries 
under study.  
3. Individual characteristics and labour market success of immigrants 
Figures 1 to 4 provide an overview of the uncontrolled mean scores on labour market participation, 
unemployment, occupational status and the chances of reaching the upper middle-class of male and 
female natives and immigrants. These figures immediately make clear that there is considerable 
variation across the 13 countries of destination in terms of the size and direction of the gaps between 
natives and immigrants in these four dimensions of labour market outcomes. In addition, we can note 
clear gender differences in all four dimensions. However, since the mean scores depicted in these 
figures are not controlled for individual characteristics, it is not clear whether the between-country 
differences are due to the differential composition of immigrants and natives in the various destination 
countries or whether they result from processes at the macro-level such as different structures of the 
labour market or different policy approaches towards the integration of immigrants. 
3.1 Comparing the labour market success of male immigrants and natives 
In order to investigate this question, we perform a number of OLS regressions separately for both 
genders. In this way, we aim to get a clear picture of, on the one hand, the effects operating at the 
individual level and, on the other hand, the relevance of including effects at the macro-level. In these 
analyses, we use data of both immigrants and natives, the latter being the reference category for the 
models including immigrant generations. Table 3 displays the effects on labour market participation of 
males. We see that there are considerable differences between the 13 countries under study (France is 
the reference category) in terms of labour market participation of the male population. Immigrants of 
both the first and second generation have lower participation rates, but as the last model shows, the 
negative effect found in the earlier model does not apply to all immigrants, but only to specific 
immigrant generations in Belgium, Austria and Greece. Furthermore, we find that immigrants from 
neighbouring countries participate at higher rates than natives, although they profit less from their 
education. Our hypotheses regarding education and age are confirmed, since higher scores on these 
variables go together with higher rates of participation. However, contrary to our expectations, higher 
parental education leads to lower rates of participation. This points to a problem with this dependent 
variable, since it is not quite clear which level of labour market participation represents higher socio-
economic integration. On the one hand, low participation rates can point to lower suitability of 
immigrants for the labour markets of the destination countries or the existence of (perceived) 
                                                      
12  These are Afghanistan, Netherlands Antilles, Aruba, Serbia and Montenegro, Faroe Islands, Greenland, Iraq, Liberia, 
Martinique and Somalia.  
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discrimination; on the other hand, especially among women, lower levels of participation can indicate 
successful integration in the sense that immigrants can afford to be inactive.  
The analysis of unemployment therefore might be more revealing since higher unemployment can 
unambiguously be considered to indicate lower success in the labour market. Table 4 shows that there 
are far fewer between-country differences in unemployment rates, with the exception of Germany 
which has higher unemployment and Luxembourg which has lower unemployment than the remaining 
11 EU countries. Throughout all models, we find that both first and second generation immigrants are 
almost twice as likely to be unemployed than their native peers, even after controlling for human 
capital and other individual characteristics. Not surprisingly, higher levels of education reduce the 
chance of being unemployed. At the same time, more religious persons are more likely to be 
unemployed, and Muslims and attendants of other non-Christian religions have unemployment rates 
which are over twice as high as those of natives. We also find origin and destination effects in this 
analysis: while immigrants from neighbouring countries are less likely to be unemployed, second 
generation immigrants in Austria are confronted with an unemployment rate that is three times higher 
than their native peers, even after controlling for education and religion. 
If we look at the occupational status of the employed  male  population, we find still different 
effects. In the first model of Table 5, we again observe considerable variation between the European 
countries under study in terms of their average occupational status, a variation that remains even after 
controlling for individual characteristics. In line with our expectations, we find that education, parental 
education and age positively affect occupational status. On the whole, immigrants do not differ from 
natives in terms of occupational status, but the main effect of the immigrant generations only becomes 
non-significant after inclusion of the interactions with countries of origin and countries of destination. 
Hence, it is not true that all immigrants differ from natives with respect to occupational status, but 
some immigrant groups, namely those originating in the EU-15+ countries and in Asia and those going 
to Denmark and Ireland do better, while the first generation in particular performs worse than natives 
in Spain and Greece. 
If the progression in occupational status were linear, we should find similar effects in the logistic 
regression of the probability of reaching the upper middle-class. However, this is only partly true. 
Table 6 shows that, even after controlling for all significant individual characteristics, first generation 
immigrants are only 50% as likely as comparable natives to enter one of the highest occupational 
classes. On the other hand, second generation immigrants are found not to differ significantly from 
their native peers, once we control for the regions of origin. As in the previous analysis, we find that 
immigrants coming from the EU-15+ countries perform better, which is due to higher returns on their 
education. In addition, we observe several significant destination effects, since the first generation is 
more likely to enter the upper middle-class in France and Ireland, but less likely in Sweden.  
3.2. Comparing the educational levels of male immigrants and natives 
Although our main focus is on immigrants’ success in the labour market, we also analyzed the highest 
level of education reached by male immigrants, since education is one of the most important 
determinants of labour market outcomes and educational inequality is likely not only to be reproduced, 
but to be severely strengthened in the labour market. In Table 11 we observe considerable differences 
between the 13 countries under study in terms of the average educational level reached. Most of these 
differences remain after controlling for individual characteristics and the differential composition of 
the immigrant population. It turns out that male immigrants of the first generation are generally less 
educated than comparable natives, while there are no significant differences between the second 
generation and their native peers, with the exception of Greece and Portugal where the second 
generation demonstrates much lower educational outcomes. As can be expected, parental education 
has a positive effect on education and so does age, indicating slightly higher levels of education 
among older men, both natives and immigrants. Interestingly, Christians, with the exception of Eastern 
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Orthodox, generally have higher levels of education. In addition, we see that first generation 
immigrants from neighbouring countries are higher educated, as are those from Sub-Saharan Africa 
and South and South-East Asia. The same holds for first generation immigrants from the post-socialist 
countries of Eastern Europe and the former USSR. At the same time, we find that Luxembourg and 
Greece attract lower educated first generation immigrants. 
3.3. Comparing the labour market success of female immigrants and natives 
Although the integration of female immigrants into the labour markets of various countries of 
destination is still widely understudied, it is generally assumed that this integration follows quite 
different processes than that of male immigrants. Our separate analyses highlight these differences, 
which, in our view, justify the separation in the analysis of both genders. This strategy has the obvious 
disadvantage that the significance of differences in the effect sizes between men and women cannot be 
tested, but on the other hand, models including both genders would unavoidably become rather 
complex and large due to the numerous interactions that occur between gender and many of the 
explanatory factors. 
It is clear that the decision whether or not to participate in the labour market is quite different for 
men than for women in all countries, but, in addition, we can observe large differences between the 13 
EU countries under study in the levels of female labour market participation (see Table 7). Not 
surprisingly, as Model 1 shows, the economic activity of women is largest in Sweden, directly 
followed by France. On the contrary, Luxembourg and the Netherlands experience particularly low 
levels of female labour market participation. We find that female immigrants of the first generation 
have almost twice the participation rates of female natives, while second generation immigrants do not 
differ from natives in this respect once we control for individual characteristics. We also find that first 
generation immigrants have lower returns on their education. This finding is not surprising, but rather 
points to the general costs of migration due to the limited transferability of human capital. The fact 
that the second generation of female immigrants does not significantly differ from their native peers in 
their labour market participation is, however, an important finding which provides some optimism 
about the level of socio-economic integration of this second generation. On the other hand, this 
optimistic outlook does not hold for all immigrants in the same way, since Muslim women have only 
half the participation rates of non-Muslim women. In addition, we find that in contrast to all other 
countries of destination, first generation female immigrants do not have higher labour market 
participation rates in Ireland (the main effect of being a first generation immigrant and its interaction 
with Ireland as a country of destination cancel each other out), a country with a rather low female 
participation rate in general.  
In the following steps, we examine the success of female immigrants once they have entered the 
labour market. With respect to female unemployment, Model 1 in Table 8 makes clear that the 
between-country differences are much larger than in the case of males, with Germany and Greece 
having higher levels of female unemployment, while Austria, Ireland and Luxembourg have much 
lower levels of female unemployment than all other countries. After controlling for individual 
characteristics, however, these between-country differences shift and show higher female 
unemployment rates in Belgium and Germany and lower rates in Austria and Luxembourg. Hence, the 
favourable position of Ireland and the unfavourable position of Greece are due to the composition of 
the immigrant and native population in these countries. Where the analysis of labour market 
participation suggested high levels of integration of female immigrants of the second generation, the 
examination of unemployment reveals a bleaker perspective. In Models 2-5 of Table 8, we find that 
female immigrants of the second generation are much more likely to be unemployed than their native 
peers and the first generation, although immigrants from neighbouring countries have much lower 
unemployment rates (a finding that also holds for male immigrants). Furthermore, we see that 
immigrants from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have lower returns on their education 
and it is likely that they experience higher unemployment irrespective of their education, since 
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belonging to the Eastern Orthodox Church can be considered a proxy for coming from this region of 
origin. However, the significant interaction in model 6 makes clear that the higher unemployment rates 
of the second generation do not apply to all female immigrants, but only to those originating in 
Northern Africa. In addition, we find that first generation female immigrants in the Netherlands are 
more than five times more likely to be unemployed than immigrants in all other countries. These 
findings highlight again the importance of including both the country of origin and the country of 
destination in the analysis, since the socio-economic integration of immigrants differs greatly between 
these contexts and not including them leads to the finding of effects that appear to be general, but are, 
in reality, specific to certain countries of destination and of origin.  
Turning to those female immigrants who do not only participate in the labour market but who 
actually succeed in finding employment, we find again considerable between-country differences in 
the average occupational status. Much like in the analysis of unemployment, we see that these 
between-country differences are strongly affected by the composition of both the native and the 
immigrant population in the 13 countries under study. Again, it seems in Models 2-5 of Table 9 that 
especially first generation, but also second generation immigrants generally have jobs of a lower 
occupational status than their native peers. However, the last model shows that, again, there are no 
general effects for both of the immigrant generations, but that the differences in occupational status are 
specific to certain countries of origin and of destination. Interestingly, immigrants from Northern 
Africa are found to have higher occupational status in both generations, while in the previous analysis 
we saw that the second generation of this group of immigrants suffers from much higher 
unemployment. While immigrants from the EU-15 countries and those from West Asia also enjoy 
generally higher occupational status once they are employed, we also find immigrant penalties in 
occupational status, especially among the first generations in Spain, Greece and Luxembourg and 
those coming from Eastern Europe, the former USSR or from Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, the 
second generation of immigrants from neighbouring countries has jobs of a lower status. 
A comparison of Table 9, which shows the results of the analysis of occupational status of the 
employed female population, and Table 10, which shows the chances of entering the upper middle-
class (i.e. the highest two classes in the EGP-class scheme), makes immediately clear that progression 
along the status line is not linear for female immigrants. Instead of finding effects for specific 
countries or regions of origin, we find mainly differences at the level of the country of destination and, 
importantly, those groups of immigrants who generally enjoy higher occupational status (those from 
the EU-15, Northern Africa and West Asia) do not have higher chances of reaching the upper-middle 
class, indicating a ceiling effect for these groups. The between country-comparison in Model 1 of 
Table 10 shows that the upper-middle class job segment for women is much larger in the Netherlands 
and much smaller in Portugal and Greece as well as in Austria than in the remaining countries. 
Perhaps not surprisingly in light of the previously mentioned costs of migration, we find that female 
immigrants of the first generation, just like their male counterparts, are much less likely to enter the 
upper middle-class, although they profit more from their education in this respect. The second 
generation appears to have equal chances compared to natives to reach the highest echelons of the 
labour market, but, as Model 6 shows, they need to be more educated than their native peers in order 
to reach the same outcomes. Again, we find significant destination effects, indicating higher levels of 
accessibility of the most attractive job segment for first generation female immigrants in Belgium and 
for the second generation in Germany. 
3.4. Comparing the educational level of female immigrants and natives 
Although our main focus is on immigrants’ success in the labour market, we also analyzed the highest 
level of education reached by female immigrants, since education is one of the most important 
determinants of labour market outcomes and educational inequality is likely not only to be reproduced, 
but to be severely strengthened in the labour market. Table 12 shows that the level of education of 
both native and immigrant women differs greatly between the 13 countries included in our analysis. 
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However, while the first generation is found to have slightly lower educational levels after controlling 
for the differential effects of parental education and taking into account origin and destination effects, 
we find, with some exceptions, no significant differences in educational outcomes between the second 
generation and natives. Not surprisingly, we find that parental education has a positive effect on the 
highest educational level achieved, while older women generally attain lower levels of education. 
More interesting are the effects of religious affiliation: while Roman Catholic, Protestant, other 
Christian and Jewish women are more educated than their non-religious peers, Islamic women have 
much lower levels of education. Furthermore, we find a number of significant effects of both the 
countries of destination and of origin on educational outcomes. While the UK appears to attract higher 
educated female immigrants, the opposite is true for Luxembourg, France and Portugal. At the same 
time, first generation immigrants from neighbouring countries and from South-East Asia are higher 
educated. Moreover, the second generation performs much better in Spain and if their parents came 
from Northern Africa and Southern Asia.  
4. The effects of social and labour market policies on immigrants’ labour market 
outcomes 
The OLS regression analyses presented in section 3 do not take the nested structure of the data into 
account. However, they make abundantly clear that there are no general ‘immigrant effects’, but that 
labour market outcomes of immigrants depend both on the country of origin and on the country of 
destination. Furthermore, while the previous analyses showed that the socio-economic integration of 
immigrants differs depending on both the country of destination and the country of origin, they did not 
allow us to identify and correctly model the factors that lead to these differential outcomes. In order to 
reach an accurate estimation of the effects of indicators on these higher levels of individual outcomes, 
a multilevel analysis is needed. We use a cross-classified multilevel model, since the individual 
immigrants in our data are nested both within countries of origin and within countries of destination, 
but these two levels crosscut each other instead of being nested within each other. We specified the 
country of origin as the second level and the country of destination as the third, i.e. variance terms 
indicated by the letter v refer to the country of destination and those with the letter u to the country of 
origin. Since these two levels are only relevant to immigrants and not to natives, we restrict our 
multilevel analyses to the immigrant population in our data. This has the advantage that we can now 
include a number of immigrant characteristics, such as the language spoken at home, whether an 
immigrant holds the citizenship of the destination country and whether he/she is the child of a mixed 
marriage between a native and an immigrant. In the joint analysis with natives, these indicators could 
not be included since their estimation would be dominated by the much larger group of natives for 
whom they are not applicable. Although we use only immigrants in the multilevel analysis, we include 
the average score of the native population on the dependent variable in every model as an independent 
variable, so that we can assess the difference between immigrants and natives.  
We build our models as follows: the null-model is not displayed in any of the tables, but we discuss 
the variance components based on this model in the text. The variance components of the higher levels 
indicate the relevance of including these levels in the analysis. Although, in general, most variation 
occurs between individuals, a substantive part might also occur between countries of origin and 
countries of destination. In the regression analyses of occupational status and education, we can 
calculate the relative importance of these higher levels, by calculating the share of the variances at the 
higher levels of the total variance. However, the variance at the individual level is not provided in 
logistic multilevel regression so that we cannot calculate the intra-class correlations for the models of 
labour market participation, unemployment and the chances of reaching the upper middle-class. Model 
1 contains four characteristics of individual immigrants (second generation, having one native and one 
immigrant parent, speaking a minority language at home and holding the citizenship of the country of 
destination) and the mean score of natives on the dependent variable. As a consequence of including 
the latter independent variable, the intercept can be interpreted as the difference in the dependent 
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variable of first generation immigrants in comparison to the average outcomes of natives. In the 
second model, we add the human capital variables and individual religious affiliation, religiosity and 
the intensity of religious practice. Model 3 further adds interactions between education, our central 
explanatory variable, and immigrant characteristics. In order to make tables comparable, we included 
all interactions which had a significant effect on any of the dependent variables. Models 4 and 5 are 
not displayed in the tables, since in these series of models, we add, one by one, the macro-
characteristics to Model 3: those of the destination countries in Models 4a to 4p, and those of the 
countries of origin in Models 5a to 5k. The effects, their standard errors and the change in -
2LogLikelihood that results from including these variables are displayed in Tables 13 (for the analysis 
of male immigrants) and 18 (female immigrants). On the basis of these tests, we include the significant 
macro-characteristics of the country of destination together in Model 6 and those of the country of 
origin in Model 7. Model 8 then contains the macro-characteristics of both the country of destination 
and the country of origin. In Model 9, we add dummies for specific regions of origin. Finally, Model 
10 is a reduced model which shows only the significant explanatory variables. In the analyses 
displayed in the tables, all effects are fixed. However, we tested whether making the immigrant 
characteristics random for the country of destination or for the country of origin significantly 
improved the analyses in comparison to the full model (Model 9). This turned out not to be the case, 
since the resulting variance terms and their covariance with the intercept were non-significant in all cases. 
4.1. Multilevel analysis of the labour market success of male immigrants 
4.1.1. Male labour market participation 
Table 14 shows the results of the multilevel logistic regression of labour market participation of male 
immigrants. Since the intercept is negative and significant in all models, we conclude that first 
generation immigrants have lower participation rates than male natives and the same holds for the 
second generation which does not significantly differ from the first, despite all controls. Neither being 
the child of one native and one immigrant parent, nor the language spoken at home, nor whether or not 
one holds the citizenship of the destination country affect the labour market participation of male 
immigrants. Individual education has no significant effect either. However, labour market participation 
increases with increasing age, but the growth levels off at a certain point. Higher levels of parental 
education reduce rather than increase immigrants’ labour market participation, but here we see the 
ambiguous nature of the dependent variable labour market participation: while low participation rates 
might indicate lower suitability of immigrants for the labour markets of the destination countries or 
that immigrants are discouraged to participate due to (perceived) discrimination, it can also mean that 
immigrants have already reached a level of socio-economic integration that makes it obsolete for them 
to participate in the labour market.  
When we look at the effects at the macro-level, we see that more favourable naturalization policies 
tend to increase the labour market participation of male immigrants. At the same time, immigrants in 
conservative welfare regimes are much less likely to be active in the labour market, while this 
likelihood increases in more unequal societies (i.e. those who have a higher GINI coefficient). With 
respect to the countries of origin, we find that immigrants from countries with more immigration are 
less active, which means at the same time that immigrants from countries with high rates of 
emigration, i.e. typical labour migrants, participate more. Immigrants from countries with higher rates 
of political freedom have somewhat lower participation rates. Given the high correlations between this 
indicator and GDP per capita, this effect can be explained in the same way as the effect of parental 
education: immigrants from more democratic and wealthier countries can afford to work less or have a 
higher reservation wage, i.e. they can afford to wait longer before they have to work. However, the 
finding that immigrants from the EU-15+ countries have higher rates of participation might undermine 
this line of argumentation. At the same time, we find that immigrants from the post-socialist countries 
of Eastern Europe and Asia are participating at higher rates than natives. Even the reduced Model 10 
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succeeds in explaining practically all of the variance both at the level of the country of origin and of 
the country of destination. In the null-model, the variance between countries of destination (0.226 with 
a standard error of 0.122) is larger than that between the countries of origin (0.090 with a standard 
error of 0.086). Apparently, the inclusion of the mean labour market participation of male natives 
accounts for a large part of the variance between countries of destination, since this variance is smaller 
than those between countries of origin in all models shown in Table 14. Differences in immigrants’ 
labour market participation between countries of destination appear to result from the differential 
composition of the individual characteristics of immigrants in these countries. The largest part of the 
variance between countries of destination is accounted for by the categories of origin countries added 
in Model 9, but the macro-characteristics added in Model 7 also account for a considerable part of the 
variance at this level.
13   
4.1.2. Male unemployment 
If we examine the unemployment rates of those male immigrants who are active in the labour market, 
we find that these are much higher, the higher the unemployment among male natives (see Table 15). 
However, after controlling for individual characteristics, the difference between first and second 
generation immigrants and natives becomes non-significant, meaning that there is no general 
immigrant penalty in unemployment rates. While the language spoken at home and citizenship of the 
destination country do not affect immigrants’ unemployment rates, children of trans-national 
marriages between one native and one immigrant parent are more likely to be unemployed if they are 
less educated, but not if they are highly educated. Overall, we find only few effects at the individual 
level. It turns out that those respondents who did not provide information on their parents’ education 
are more often unemployed. Furthermore, Muslims are also confronted with higher unemployment 
rates. 
At the macro-level, we find that immigrants in countries with a social-democratic welfare regime 
tend to be less often unemployed while those in conservative welfare regimes tend to be more often 
unemployed. Furthermore, unemployment among male immigrants seems to be slightly higher in 
wealthier countries of destination. With respect to the countries of origin, it turns out that immigrants 
from more unequal and politically more stable societies are less often unemployed, while those from 
less developed societies tend to be somewhat more unemployed. It is not surprising that we find only 
few and mostly non-significant effects at the macro-level, given the lack of variance at the level of the 
country of origin (which is also 0.000 with a standard error of 0.000 in the null-model). Between 
countries of destination, there is some variance in unemployment rates (the variance term in the null-
model is 0.182 with a standard error of 0.150), but this is completely accounted for by the differences 
in the mean unemployment of natives. Nevertheless, we find a strong and significant effect for 
immigrants coming from neighbouring countries. That they are unemployed less often than other 
immigrants probably reveals their migration motives, since it is likely that their migration is a 
consequence of better job opportunities in a neighbouring country. In addition, these might be 
respondents living in border areas who commute between countries due to discrepancies in the labour 
and housing market between neighbouring countries. 
4.1.3. Male occupational status 
Turning to the occupational status of employed male immigrants, we observe in Table 16 that the first 
generation does not differ significantly from natives, with the exception of the last, parsimonious 
model, where first generation immigrants have higher status positions than natives. The second 
                                                      
13  We observe an increase in the variance at the level of the country of origin from the null-model until Model 3, which 
might appear counter-intuitive, but which indicates that disregarding effects at the individual level leads to an 
underestimation of the variance at the level of the country of origin.  
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generation, however, has jobs of a significantly higher status than the first generation, once we control 
for individual characteristics
14. Other individual characteristics of immigrants do not influence their 
occupational status. As we expected, both personal and parental education increase one’s occupational 
status, but age does not have any effect. Contrary to our expectations, higher numbers of children go 
together with lower occupational status. There are no effects of religious affiliation, but respondents 
who practise more enjoy higher occupational status, which might be an effect of the social capital that 
results from being active in a religious community.  
Although most (80.4%) of the total variation in this multilevel regression model lies at the 
individual level and we succeed in accounting for 22.5% of this variance, the null-model shows that 
the occupational status of immigrants also varies between countries of destination (5.6% of the total 
variance is located at this level) and between countries of origin (which accounts for 14.0% of the total 
variance). The macro-characteristics of these countries that we add to our models succeed in 
explaining practically all of this variance at both of the higher levels. We find that immigrants in 
countries with a more rigid labour market, i.e. higher levels of employment protection legislation, are 
more often found in low-status jobs. The same holds for immigrants from more developed countries 
and for those coming from post-socialist societies
15.  
4.1.4. Male upper middle class 
In Table 17, we present the results of the multilevel logistic regression of male immigrants’ chances of 
reaching the upper middle-class. Throughout all models, we find that first generation immigrants have 
significantly lower chances of reaching the highest occupational classes; for second generation 
immigrants, the chances are somewhat better, but they are still less likely than natives to enter the 
upper middle-class. None of the other immigrant characteristics affects the probability of immigrants 
reaching the highest occupational classes, but both education and parental education have the expected 
positive effect.  
In addition to the effects at the individual level, we find a number of effects at the higher levels. 
With respect to the countries of destination, we find that more favourable naturalization policies 
increase the likelihood of male immigrants entering the upper middle-class, while stricter employment 
protection legislation reduces their chances across all models. Including these explanatory factors 
accounts for a considerable part of the variance at this level, this has a value of 0.268 (with a standard 
error of 0.156) in the null-model. Again, we see that disregarding individual differences leads to an 
underestimation of the variance at the higher level, since the variance component of the country of 
destination increases once these individual characteristics are controlled for. However, in this as in 
many other analyses, the variance is larger at the level of the country of origin (0.329 with a standard 
error of 0.149 in the null-model) and we succeed in explaining practically all of this variance with our 
macro-indicators. We find that immigrants from more politically stable countries have somewhat 
smaller chances of entering the upper middle-class while those originating in post-socialist societies 
are particularly disadvantaged. 
                                                      
14  The positive main effect for the second generation means that they have higher-status jobs than natives with comparable 
human capital. Since, however, the uncontrolled average occupational status does not differ significantly between natives 
and second generation immigrants, it appears that the composition of the second generation in terms of human capital is 
less favourable than that of the native population. 
15  In Models 7 and 8, we observe a significant effect for prevalently Eastern Orthodox countries, which disappears once we 
include the dummy for the post-socialist countries. This means that it is not the prevailing religion in this case, but the 
social structure due to the socialist past that affects the outcomes of immigrants from these countries. 
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4.2. Multilevel analysis of the highest level of education of male immigrants 
Table 18 presents the results of the multilevel analysis of the highest level of education of male 
immigrants. We find no significant differences in the educational level between natives and both first 
and second generation immigrants. However, in countries where native men have higher levels of 
education, immigrants are also more educated. Immigrants who speak a language other than the 
national language at home have much lower levels of education, although this negative effect occurs 
especially among immigrants with lowly educated parents, while immigrants with highly educated 
parents profit from their bilingualism. It turns out that those respondents who did not provide 
information on their parents’ education are significantly less educated. Muslims tend to have lower 
levels of education, but this effect disappears once we control for the macro-characteristics of the 
origin country. The individual characteristics account for 12% of the variance at this lowest level, 
which makes up 74.8% of the total variance. 10.5% of the total variance is located at the level of the 
country of destination, while the country of origin accounts for another 14.7%. Our most parsimonious 
model succeeds in accounting for all of the variation in immigrants’ education that occurs between 
destination countries and for 75% of the variation that occurs between origin countries. Although 
holding the citizenship of the destination country does not affect an immigrant’s educational level, 
more favourable naturalization policies positively affect this outcome. In addition, immigrants in 
countries with a liberal welfare regime (Ireland and the United Kingdom) are more educated. With 
respect to the countries of origin, we find a small but significant effect of the net migration rate which 
indicates that typical labour migrants who come from countries with high levels of emigration are 
somewhat less educated. 
4.3. Multilevel analysis of the labour market success of female immigrants 
In the multilevel analysis of female immigrants’ success in the labour market, we follow the same 
modelling strategy as described in section 4.  
4.3.1. Female labour market participation 
First, we examine the participation rates of female immigrants; the results of this multilevel logistic 
regression are shown in Table 20. Throughout all models, we find that the labour market participation 
of female natives positively affects the participation rates of female immigrants. However, both first 
and second generation immigrants have lower rates of labour market participation than their native 
peers, especially after controlling for individual characteristics. Immigrant characteristics do not play a 
direct role, but those immigrant women who hold the citizenship of the destination country have 
higher returns on education in terms of their participation rates. Furthermore, female labour market 
participation increases with age, but the increase levels off at a certain point. In line with our 
expectations, we find that the more children a female immigrant has, the less likely she is to be active 
in the labour market. In addition, Muslim women are significantly less likely to participate in the 
labour market in their countries of destination.  
The null-model shows that there is significant variation in the participation rates of female 
immigrants between countries of destination (the variance component amounts to 0.282 with a 
standard error of 0.130). However, this variance is almost completely accounted for by the differences 
in the participation rates of female natives which are already entered in Model 1. Nevertheless, we find 
some small effects at this level: while more favourable anti-discrimination legislation tends to 
decrease the labour market participation of female immigrants, their participation rates tend to be 
higher in social-democratic welfare regimes and in countries with stricter employment protection 
legislation. At the level of the country of origin, there does not seem to be any significant variance at 
the outset (the variance component in the null-model is 0.000 with a standard error of 0.000). 
However, we do find small significant effects: female immigrants from more unequal societies have 
slightly higher participation rates, while those from countries with more political rights and higher 
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GDP per capita have lower participation rates. It is likely that these women from more wealthy and 
democratic countries can simply afford not to work.  
4.3.2. Female unemployment 
When analysing the unemployment of female immigrants, we find far fewer effects. Table 21 shows 
that while high unemployment among female natives increases unemployment among female 
immigrants, the latter do not significantly differ from the former once we control for individual 
characteristics. However, it is not quite clear which of these individual characteristics is most 
important in affecting female unemployment, since none of the individual level variables are 
significant.  
There is variation both at the level of the country of destination and at the level of the country of 
origin as the null-model makes clear. The variance components are 0.123 (standard error: 0.179) for 
country of destination and 0.246 (standard error: 0.376) for country of origin. The variation between 
countries of destination is completely accounted for by the individual characteristics of their different 
immigrant populations. Nevertheless, we find that female immigrants in the social-democratic welfare 
regime are much less likely to be unemployed, while more favourable family reunification policies, 
stricter employment protection legislation and more inequality all tend to increase unemployment 
among immigrant women. The variation between countries of origin disappears when we control for 
the effects of the countries of destination and for GDP per capita and political stability of the countries 
of origin, which lower unemployment among female immigrants, and the prevalent religion in the 
country of origin. Here we find that women from both Christian and Islamic countries are more likely 
to be unemployed, but the effect of coming from an Islamic country is much stronger. 
4.3.3. Female occupational status  
In terms of the occupational status of employed immigrant women, Table 22 initially shows no 
significant differences between immigrants of both generations and natives. However, after including 
macro-characteristics of both the countries of destination and the countries of origin, immigrant 
women of both generations are found to have a higher occupational status than their native 
counterparts. At the same time, we find a strong negative effect of speaking a minority language at 
home across all models. In line with our expectations, education and parental education positively 
affect the occupational status of female immigrants. These individual level variables account for 
23.8% of the variance at the individual level, which makes up 84.1% of the total variance. 
5.3% of the total variance is located at the level of the countries of destination and we succeed in 
accounting for this variance with our macro-characteristics. We find that immigrant women have 
higher-status jobs in countries with a conservative welfare regime, but they tend to have lower-status 
jobs in countries with a social-democratic welfare regime. Just like male immigrants, female 
immigrants have a lower occupational status in countries with stricter employment protection 
legislation. The country of origin of female immigrants also has an important influence on their 
occupational status and accounts for 10.6% of the total variance. In our most complete model, 95.4% 
of the variance at this level is accounted for, but the largest share is due to individual characteristics. 
Most origin effects are not significant, but female immigrants from Eastern Orthodox and/or post-
socialist countries, as well as neighbouring countries, tend to have lower-status jobs, while those 
coming from the EU-15+ and former colonies tend to have higher-status jobs.  
4.3.4. Female upper middle class  
A quite different picture emerges from the analysis of the chances of female immigrants entering the 
upper middle-class (see Table 23). When taking into account individual characteristics, we find that 
first generation immigrant women do not differ from natives in terms of their chances of reaching one 
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of the highest occupational classes. At the same time, second generation immigrants are more likely to 
enter the upper middle-class if they have low levels of education, but the higher their level of 
education, the smaller their advantage in comparison to first generation immigrants. At the same time, 
education has a positive affect on the chances of all immigrants entering the highest occupational 
classes.  
At the macro-level, we find considerable variation both between countries of destination (the 
variance component of the null-model is 0.197 with a standard error of 0.127) and between countries 
of origin (the variance component of the null-model is 0.155 with a standard error of 0.142). Most of 
the variance between destination countries is accounted for by the average proportion of female 
natives with occupations in the upper-middle class and individual characteristics. We find a positive 
effect of more favourable anti-discrimination policies and negative effects of the presence of left-wing 
parties in the government and the net migration rate. However, none of these effects is significant and 
it must therefore not be surprising that they account for only 8.1% of the variation between destination 
countries. All of the variance between countries of origin is accounted for by individual characteristics 
and we only find very small and non-significant effects at this level. Female immigrants from 
primarily immigrant sending countries and those from countries with less political freedom and lower 
rates of development tend to be less likely to enter the upper middle-class.  
4.4. Multilevel analysis of the highest level of education of female immigrants 
The results of the multilevel analysis of the highest level of education of female immigrants presented 
in Table 24 show that there are no significant differences in educational level between native women 
and immigrants of both generations. At the same time, we find that the level of education of female 
immigrants is higher in countries where native women also attain, on average, a higher level of 
education. Where we find effects of the immigrant characteristics, these are negative, which is not in 
line with our expectations with the exception of speaking a minority language at home. Throughout all 
models, we find that older women are more educated than younger women, although the age benefit 
decreases from a certain age. In line with our expectations, parental education has a strongly 
significant positive effect on the education of female immigrants, but this relationship is less strong for 
second generation immigrants. Furthermore, we find that Islamic women are less educated and that 
less educated women have more children than more educated women. These individual characteristics 
account for 19% of the variation between individuals, which makes up the largest share (73.1%) of the 
total variance in education between female immigrants. 10.3% of this variation is located at the level 
of the country of destination, while the country of origin accounts for the remaining 16.6%. Although 
97% of the variation between destination countries and 72% of the variation between origin countries 
is accounted for in our full model (Model 9 in Table 24), we can identify only one significant macro-
effect. We find that, in addition to the effect of the Islamic faith at the individual level, coming from a 
country that is prevalently Islamic negatively affects the highest level of education reached by female 
immigrants. Our results thus show that there are no general discrepancies in educational level between 
natives and immigrants, whether in the first or in the second generation, but that Muslim women are 
seriously disadvantaged in both generations.  
5. Discussion and conclusion 
Our results reveal some important insights into the socio-economic integration of immigrants from 
various countries of origin in the 13 European countries that we studied. First of all, we find quite 
marked differences in the effects on labour market participation, unemployment, occupational status 
and the chances of reaching the highest segment of the labour market. These four indicators should 
therefore be regarded as separate, although interrelated, dimensions of socio-economic integration. 
Any study that is limited to only one of these factors will necessarily give only a partial and therefore 
biased account of the success of immigrants in the labour markets of their destination countries. For 
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the same reasons, certain dimensions of immigrants’ integration, other than the labour market, might 
be related to different processes and mechanisms.  
In addition, we saw that immigrants’ integration processes differ strongly between men and 
women. These differences might be due to different migration motives, since a part of the female 
immigrant population may migrate due to family reunification processes or as the future brides of first 
or second generation immigrants who are already settled in the destination country. Furthermore, just 
like in the native population of most European countries, labour market participation rates differ 
considerably between men and women and many of the reasons why women often have lower 
participation rates than men also affect their outcomes in the labour market once they have entered it. 
For instance, Muslim women are found to have much lower rates of participation in the labour market, 
but, in addition, they also have lower levels of education. Since education is one of the central 
predictors of labour market outcomes, these women are also less likely to avoid unemployment and to 
enter high-status occupations, net of the negative effects of being a female Muslim.  
5.1. Religious affiliation 
This example also highlights the importance of religious affiliation for the socio-economic integration 
of immigrants. While individual religion is not conventionally taken into account in comparable 
analyses of immigrant integration, our results show that it is certainly worthwhile to include this 
factor. We found disadvantages specifically for Muslims, even after controlling for human capital, in 
all of the destination countries that we examined: while Muslim men have significantly higher 
unemployment rates than non-Muslim immigrants and they tend to have lower returns on education on 
all of the four different labour market outcomes, Muslim women, as mentioned above, are primarily 
affected in terms of their participation rates and their education. Although the lower economic activity 
among immigrant women of Islamic faith might be attributed to more gender-biased task distributions 
within their ethnic communities, our findings can be explained by two factors. Firstly, it is possible 
that Muslims have a different religious habitus from non-Muslims that makes them less likely to 
succeed in the labour market, for instance if one of their religious values (honour) partly contradicts 
one of the conditions of success in modern capitalism (productivity). However, before drawing any 
strong conclusions based on a possible religious explanation, it deserves more detailed investigation, 
for instance with the help of the large variation within the Muslim community (e.g. between Sunnites 
and Shiites).
16 A second explanation of our result might be discrimination against Muslims, be it direct 
or indirect, in the labour markets of the 13 EU countries. We are aware that this is a strong claim, but 
the persistence of the negative effect of being a Muslim after controlling for human capital and especially 
the lower returns on education that Muslims experience, make this second explanation more plausible. 
5.2. Citizenship 
While an individual’s religious affiliation turns out to be important for labour market success, we 
found that the question whether or not immigrants hold the citizenship of the destination country does 
not play any role of significance. The absence of an effect of citizenship is an important finding since 
it has been argued many times that more generous naturalization policies are beneficial to immigrants’ 
integration into their host societies. The creators of the European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion 
Index (Geddes et al, 2004) take a similar position when they rate naturalization policies as one of the 
five policy dimensions which are perceived to be crucial for immigrant integration. Although it is 
possible that differences in naturalization rates and the ease with which immigrants can adopt the 
citizenship of the destination country affect other dimensions of immigrant integration, especially the 
socio-cultural
17, our analyses have shown that citizenship is not so crucial for their socio-economic 
                                                      
16  Unfortunately, we cannot take this large variation into account since it is not measured in the European Social Survey. 
17  Unfortunately, we cannot investigate this dimension of immigrant integration with the data at hand. 
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integration. While this finding might be controversial, we are quite confident about its robustness, 
since we found no cross-country differences in the effects of citizenship despite large variations in 
naturalization rates between the 13 EU countries that we studied (see Table 2.a. for the differences in 
naturalization rates of the immigrants in our sample and Tables IV and V in the appendix for the 
results of the randomization of citizenship). 
5.3. Origin and destination 
Our multilevel analyses made clear that effects at the macro-level, both in the countries of destination 
and in the countries of origin, have an impact on the socio-economic integration of immigrants. 
Although individual characteristics are the most important predictors of this integration, we found a 
number of significant effects that account for the variation in labour market outcomes and educational 
level between immigrants in different countries of destination and coming from different countries of 
origin. Throughout most of the analyses, we found more variation between countries of origin than 
between countries of destination, which highlights the importance of the differences in the 
composition of the immigrant population that exist between destination countries for the explanation 
of differential labour market success of immigrants in these countries.  
However, our analyses identified only few factors which can account for these variations. The 
prevalent religion in the country of origin was not found to play a crucial role, with the notable 
exception of the level of education of female immigrants. This provides little support for the argument 
that cultural distance, expressed in religious differences between the country of destination and 
country of origin, is an important predictor of immigrants’ integration, at least in socio-economic 
terms. Our data shows that there is no evidence of a direct “clash of civilizations” (Huntington, 1996) 
that would govern the relations between societies with different religions, especially the Islamic and 
the non-Islamic world. However, one can interpret the significant effects of individual Muslim 
affiliation as evidence of a indirect “clash”, either as a consequence of a religious habitus of the Islam 
or of discrimination against Muslims by Europeans.  
5.4. Macro-factors of origin countries 
Political stability and political freedom in the countries of origin were found to lower the labour 
market participation rates of both male and female immigrants, but also to lower their unemployment 
rates. Furthermore, these indicators have a slight negative effect on occupational status and the 
chances of entering the upper middle-class. As we argued in the introduction, political stability and 
freedom in the country of origin partly reflect the migration motives of immigrants. Those who come 
from more unstable and less free countries are more likely to arrive as refugees and this specific group 
of immigrants usually has less favourable labour market outcomes, due to the less positive selection 
process
18, their greater difficulties in adapting to their new environment, possibly resulting from the 
stressful and traumatic experiences that initiated their migration in the first place or their greater 
orientation towards their home country (as compared to other migrants). The effect of the net 
migration rate of the country of origin is another finding that highlights the importance of migration 
motives for the socio-economic integration of immigrants. We find that immigrants who come from 
countries with high levels of emigration, (such as e.g. many post-socialist societies or Morocco) are 
more likely to participate in the labour market, but have lower chances of having high-status jobs. This 
makes clear that these are typical labour migrants or guest workers, since being active in the labour 
                                                      
18   There are notable exceptions to this general pattern, e.g. Iranian refugees who generally have very high levels of 
education. However, based on economists’ approaches to migration theory, it is expected that labour migrants are more 
positively selected since they face a quite different cost-benefit analysis than refugees. While for the latter, the benefit of 
leaving their country of origin will potentially outweigh all costs, the former have to take the costs of migration in the 
form of lower transferability of human capital into account when taking the decision whether or not to migrate, which is 
expected to result in higher emigration rates among individuals with higher levels of human capital.  
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market of the destination countries is the primary motive of their migration while they often choose 
occupations which generate financial resources in the short term, but which have lower returns in the 
long run. In addition, we found that immigrants from more unequal societies have somewhat better 
labour market outcomes, since a higher GINI coefficient in the country of origin goes together with 
lower unemployment among males and higher participation rates among females.  
5.5. Inside or outside the European Union 
Although our explanatory factors at the level of the country of origin can partly explain the differences 
in the labour market outcomes of immigrants, another part of this variation can be explained by certain 
types of countries of origin. In general, immigrants originating in the EU-15 countries, Switzerland or 
Norway have more favourable outcomes, as do immigrants from neighbouring countries. While 
immigrants from the post-socialist countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia have considerably 
worse outcomes, there are no effects of coming from a former colony or territory of the destination 
country. Although the found effects, with the exception of the absence of the effect of former colonies, 
are in line with our expectations, it is not quite clear why the effects of these regions show up even 
after taking into account important characteristics of the countries of origin, such as GDP per capita. In 
the case of immigrants from the EU-15+ and from neighbouring countries, a possible explanation for 
their better outcomes might lie in the fact that the cultural distances between their countries of origin 
and their countries of destination are quite small which should facilitate their overall integration into 
the societies of the destination countries. At the same time, the higher success rates of immigrants 
from the EU-15 can be interpreted as evidence of the functioning of the European Union and the 
realization of its goals of free movements of capital, goods and persons. The growing integration of 
national labour markets into a European economic system, the ongoing equalization of the European 
systems of vocational and higher education and the dismantling of administrative barriers to intra-EU 
migration are likely to be among the reasons why individuals moving within the European Union have 
fewer problems integrating into labour markets outside their country of origin.  
5.6. Integration policies of destination countries 
Even despite the fact that the socio-economic integration of immigrants appears to be influenced more 
by the characteristics of the countries of origin than by those of the countries of destination, we find a 
number of effects at the latter level. However, the various dimensions of the European Civic 
Citizenship and Inclusion Index are not among the most powerful explanatory factors. In addition, 
while the creators of this index argue that higher scores on the five dimensions of this index should 
promote the integration of immigrants, the found effects are not always positive. Among male 
immigrants, we find that more favourable naturalization policies increase their labour market 
participation and education level, whilst reducing their unemployment rates, a finding which supports 
the argumentation behind the Index. The effects on female immigrants, however, are not in line with 
this reasoning, since female immigrants are less likely to participate in the labour market in countries 
which have anti-discrimination legislation considered to be more favourable by the creators of the 
Index. At the same time, these anti-discrimination measures increase the chances of female 
immigrants entering the upper middle-class once they participate in the labour market. However, we 
also find that female immigrants are more likely to be unemployed in countries where the legal 
process of family reunification is easier. We consciously refrain from characterizing these countries as 
having more favourable family reunification policies, the term that is used by the authors of the 
European Inclusion Index, since it turns out that the effects of the various dimensions of this legal 
Index are not always as favourable in real life as they would seem from a legal point of view.  
The meagre results of the European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index and its five dimensions 
suggest that differences in the policy approaches towards immigrants between the 13 destination 
countries do not have a large impact on the socio-economic integration of these immigrants. However, 
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this does not necessarily mean that policies do not matter, since they may affect other dimensions of 
immigrant integration not examined here. On the other hand, even the developers of this Index argue 
that integration into the labour market is a precondition for spatial, socio-cultural and political 
integration, so we should not expect large effects of different policies when analyzing other 
dimensions of immigrant integration. An argument in the defence of the usefulness of the Index is, 
however, that the absence of strong effects in our analyses might be due to little variation on the index 
scores and the low number of countries of destination included in our analysis. Hence, including more, 
and more varied, countries of destination in our analysis will allow us to better assess the usefulness of 
this policy indicator in future research. 
5.7. Labour market protection in destination countries 
One of the most important factors accounting for the differential labour market outcomes of 
immigrants in the 13 EU countries is the level of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL). We find 
that in countries with a more rigid labour market, both male and female immigrants have significantly 
lower occupational status. In addition, male immigrants are less likely to enter the upper middle-class 
and female immigrants tend to participate less and suffer greater unemployment if the level of EPL is 
higher. This means that, while high levels of EPL are probably beneficial to the insiders in the labour 
market who hold high-status jobs, they have the side effect of emphasising the gap between insiders 
and outsiders in the labour market. The finding that EPL especially prevents immigrants from finding 
higher-status jobs suggests that a consequence of higher EPL might lie in higher levels of statistical 
discrimination, since in a more rigid labour market employers take more risks when hiring new 
employees due to the increased costs of getting rid of an unproductive employee. Since statistical 
discrimination is hard to prove and difficult to address for policy-makers, a more efficient suggestion 
to promote equal opportunities for immigrants in European labour markets would be to loosen the 
Employment Protection Legislation. Although it is understandable that the employed population will 
not be pleased with the increasing pressure that is put on their employment security, they should 
understand that this comfortable position for insiders has a number of perverse side-effects which 
might pose larger problems for society as a whole in the long run than a less secure labour market 
position. We do not only point to the economic disadvantage of a suboptimal use of the human capital 
of immigrants, but more specifically to the danger of creating a frustrated immigrant population that 
cannot translate individual skills into occupational status in the same way as their native peers.  
5.8. Welfare states and immigrants 
In addition to the characteristics of the labour market, we find that welfare regimes also have a role to 
play in explaining the success or absence of immigrants in the labour market. In contrast to Kogan 
(2007), we do not find liberal welfare regimes to have specifically beneficial effects, but our analysis 
suggests slightly better socio-economic integration of immigrants in countries with a social-
democratic welfare regime and lower levels of integration in countries with a conservative or southern 
welfare regime. To be more precise, both male and female immigrants have lower unemployment rates 
in the social democratic welfare regime, while men also tend to participate more in these countries. On 
the contrary, participation rates are lower among male immigrants in the conservative welfare regime, 
highlighting the objective of this type of welfare state to maintain socio-economic boundaries, in this 
case between insiders and outsiders in the labour market. At the same time, we find that female 
immigrants have higher-status jobs in countries with a conservative welfare regime. In the southern 
welfare regime, participation rates are higher among female immigrants. Given the low levels of social 
security in the southern welfare regime, the latter finding again highlights the ambiguous character of 
labour market participation, especially among women, since it is likely that in these countries, women 
have to participate more out of economic necessity. This argumentation is supported by our finding 
that female immigrants in the southern welfare regime tend to have a lower occupational status.  
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5.9. Progress of the second generation? 
Our previous discussion of the effects of indicators at the macro-level of both the countries of origin 
and the countries of destination has shown that these higher-level effects are important to take into 
account when analyzing the socio-economic integration of immigrants across countries. While it is 
clear that the characteristics of the countries of destination will affect both first generation immigrants 
and their children (in fact, the second and later generations are likely to be even more influenced by 
the receiving context), it is not straightforward to assume that the characteristics of the country of 
destination continue to have effects on the integration of the second generation. However, we found 
that these macro-processes affect the second generation in the same way as the first, since the effect of 
belonging to the second rather than the first generation of immigrants does not interact with the 
country of origin in our analyses of labour market outcomes.
19 This finding highlights the importance 
of socialization processes within immigrant families, since we assume that it is due to these processes 
that the countries of origin continue to affect the second generation of immigrants. However, the 
emergence of trans-national networks in the form of the availability of mass media and affordable 
travel opportunities to the countries of origin might also be one of the explanations for this persistent 
influence of the country of origin on the socio-economic integration of second generation immigrants. 
The question of how exactly this influence is transmitted from the first to later generations of 
immigrants and at what time, if at all, it will vanish, is certainly an interesting and challenging topic for 
future research. 
The finding of the persistence of the importance of the characteristics of the countries of origin 
even in later generations of immigrants is important for yet another reason: it makes clear that there is 
no general process of assimilation taking place among the immigrant generations in Europe. Due to 
the continuing effects of the country of origin on the second generation, the degree to which 
immigrants assimilate socio-economically depends on their origin and is therefore not universal. In 
addition, although we find that the second generation has better labour market outcomes than the first 
generation in a number of respects, they are still at a disadvantage compared to natives, even after 
controlling for human capital. This holds especially for their chances of entering the highest 
occupational classes, which indicates that a certain degree of upward social mobility between 
immigrant generations is possible, but there is a ceiling effect preventing immigrants from reaching 
the most desirable positions in the labour markets of European countries. This ceiling effect is even 
stronger for higher educated female immigrants of the second generation who have lower returns on 
their education in terms of their chances of entering the upper middle-class.  
In light of the current debates about the success or failure of immigrant integration in the EU and 
the fear of radicalization, especially among Muslim youth, we think that these findings are important 
and should be taken very seriously by policy-makers and the general public. The lower returns to 
education of occupational status, and particularly on the chances of reaching the most desirable 
occupational classes, of second generation immigrants are the most troublesome findings in this 
respect. These lower returns mean that the gap between natives and second generation immigrants 
with comparable levels of human capital is widest among the most highly educated immigrants who 
do not succeed in finding occupations that suit their skills, but have to settle for lower-status jobs 
while the natives they studied with can more easily translate their qualifications into high-status jobs. 
We think that these ceiling effects, occurring mainly among the highly-educated second generation, 
are a topic of great concern, more so than the fact that many second generation immigrants still have 
less favourable educational and labour market outcomes than natives. Since the gap between natives 
and second generation immigrants in occupational status is smaller among the less educated, we do not 
                                                      
19   However, the effect of belonging to the second generation of immigrants at their highest educational level differs 
between countries of origin for male immigrants, as does the effect of parental education on female immigrants’ 
education. We will further investigate these random effects in our chapter about educational outcomes of immigrants that 
is to be published in the book of the European Forum 2006-7.  
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expect these immigrants to experience the same levels of frustration that are likely to occur among the 
highly-educated second generation immigrants who appear to always pull the short straw when 
compared to their native peers. We argue that if social cohesion within European societies is 
threatened as a consequence of an unsuccessful integration of immigrants, it is due to these unequal 
outcomes of the highly-educated second generation.  
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  Portugal N 
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Unemployment (%) 
Mean ISEI 
Std. Dev. ISEI 
High EGP (%) 




















































Lab. Mark. Part. (%) 
Unemployment (%) 
Mean ISEI 
Std. Dev. ISEI 



































































  France N 
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  Turkey N 
Lab. Mark. Part. (%) 
Unemployment (%) 
Mean ISEI 
Std. Dev. ISEI 
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  Poland N 
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  Finland N 
Lab. Mark. Part. (%) 
Unemployment (%) 
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  Morocco N 
Lab. Mark. Part. (%) 
Unemployment (%) 
Mean ISEI 
Std. Dev. ISEI 

















































  Albania N 
Lab. Mark. Part. (%) 
Unemployment (%) 
Mean ISEI 
Std. Dev. ISEI 
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Lab. Mark. Part. (%) 
Unemployment (%) 
Mean ISEI 
Std. Dev. ISEI 
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  Algeria N 
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Unemployment (%) 
Mean ISEI 
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  Brazil N 
Lab. Mark. Part. (%) 
Unemployment (%) 
Mean ISEI 
Std. Dev. ISEI 


























































Lab. Mark. Part. (%) 
Unemployment (%) 
Mean ISEI 
Std. Dev. ISEI 











































  Angola N 
Lab. Mark. Part. (%) 
Unemployment (%) 
Mean ISEI 
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Unemployment (%) 
Mean ISEI 
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Source: European Social Survey 2004 (unweighted data)Table 2.a. Independent variables per country of destination (natives vs. immigrants) 
Independent 






































































Austria  Natives 2.36  42.8  2.05  2.4  5.20  2.23  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
  Immigrants 2.32 42.6  2.22  13.0  5.16  2.23  44.1  54.9  19.6  50.0  54.9  37.1  75.9  40.2 
Belgium  Natives 3.01  42.8  2.69  1.6  4.40  1.13  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
  Immigrants 2.81 41.1  2.34  22.6  5.36  1.54  47.7  52.3  18.6  35.2  38.7  61.8  68.8  2.5 
Denmark  Natives 3.19  43.6  3.19  1.4  4.09  1.19  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
  Immigrants 3.19 41.1  3.62  16.3  4.39  1.52  47.5  52.5  15.0  55.0  43.8  41.3  80.0  7.5 
France  Natives 2.69  43.3  2.05  0.0
i 3.34  0.98  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
  Immigrants 2.55 43.7  1.70  34.0  4.22  1.97  38.9  61.1  13.8  46.8  36.9  44.8  81.3  41.4 
Germany  Natives 3.22  43.3  3.40  1.1  3.56  1.31  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
  Immigrants 3.00 41.5  2.97  16.9  4.87  2.21  61.4  38.6  27.3  32.9  26.9  14.1  69.9  19.3 
Greece  Natives 2.51  42.1  1.44  1.2  6.89  3.23  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
  Immigrants 2.43 40.3  1.77  9.0  7.07  3.07  73.4  26.6  29.8  17.6  61.2  6.4  44.1  0.0 
Ireland  Natives 2.61  43.5  1.87  0.3  5.75  3.67  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
  Immigrants 3.21 40.3  2.82  5.8  4.65  2.85  63.1  36.9  7.8  55.3  67.0  77.7  60.2  0.0 
Luxembourg  Natives 2.73  43.9  2.38  1.4  4.01  1.61  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
  Immigrants 2.43 40.4  1.89  7.2  4.52  1.84  69.5  30.4  40.5  22.3  35.0  83.2  31.3  0.0 
Netherlands  Natives 2.91  43.7  2.36  1.0  4.65  1.49  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
  Immigrants 2.89 41.5  2.52  13.8  5.41  1.63  59.3  40.7  14.8  41.3  27.5  34.9  77.8  27.0 
Portugal  Natives 1.64  42.0  1.07  0.3  4.95  2.53  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
  Immigrants 1.68 37.8  1.78  8.5  5.15  2.59  83.1  16.9  18.6  16.9  5.1  6.8  42.4  76.3 
Spain  Natives 2.30  41.2  1.37  1.0  4.03  1.61  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
  Immigrants 2.32 37.8  1.62  27.0  5.39  2.67  79.8  11.2  37.1  13.5  21.4  13.3  25.8  37.1 
Sweden  Natives 2.80  43.2  2.27  0.8  3.35  0.94  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
  Immigrants 3.01 42.5  2.60  7.4  3.70  1.34  54.6  45.4  25.9  34.7  51.4  53.7  81.0  40.3 
United 
Kingdom  Natives 2.73  42.2  2.61  1.2  3.84  1.35  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
  Immigrants 2.10 38.0  3.11  20.6  5.42  2.50  49.5  50.5  19.1  39.7  22.5  29.0  78.9  72.4 
Total  Natives 2.67  42.9  2.21  5.1  4.55  2.87  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
 Immigrants 2.69  41.0  2.32  16.7  4.96  3.01  59.3  40.7  25.1  34.2  38.5  45.7  61.1  23.2 
Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data 
Ταβλε 56.  Adapted ISCED-97 scale 
** This percentage does not include non-religious respondents, but only those who rate themselves as belonging to a non-Christian religion (Islam, Judaism, Eastern religions, other non-Christian religion). 
*** 0= Not at all until 10 = Very religious 
**** How often do you attend religious services apart from special occasions and how often do you pray apart from religious services? 1= Never until 7= Every day 
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Germany  209  2.86  43.1 2.89    4.3  4.07  2.50  32.5  67.5    3.8 68.9 76.1    0.0 
Portugal  194  1.53  40.0  0.77    9.3 5.59 3.44  87.6  12.4 75.3    2.1  12.4    0.0 
Italy (+ San Marino)  184  2.55  43.8 1.53 18.5  5.01  2.71  35.3  64.7  14.7 35.9 58.7    0.0 
France  131  3.05  41.8 2.70    1.5  3.53  2.06  56.5  43.5    4.6 44.3 51.1    0.0 
Turkey  128  2.06  42.5 1.32 52.3  6.70  4.10  58.6  41.4  42.2 19.5 66.4    0.0 
Former Yugoslavia (- Slovenia)  125  2.40  40.5 1.76 28.0  4.68  2.76  76.0  24.0  49.6 12.0 55.2  32.8 
United Kingdom  104  3.17  42.2  2.95    5.8 4.52 3.31  58.6  41.4 14.4  56.7  60.6    0.0 
Poland  103  3.08  42.6  3.13    6.8 4.43 2.58  57.3  42.7 19.4  38.8  77.7 46.6 
Former USSR (- Ukraine & 
Baltic cntr.)  82 2.90  40.9  2.74    3.7 5.72 3.57  90.2  9.8 39.0    6.1  75.6    0.0 
Finland  74  3.05  42.6  2.09    2.7 3.84 2.31  45.9  54.1 14.9  36.5  81.1 95.9 
Belgium  73  3.32  42.0 3.04    4.1  4.36  2.44  57.5  42.5    4.1 43.8 49.3    0.0 
Morocco  72  2.39  36.5 1.39 82.0  6.28  3.57  65.3  34.7  48.6 20.1 65.3  31.9 
Albania  68  2.19  35.5  1.74  19.1 6.41 3.46  98.5    1.5 47.1    4.4  14.7    0.0 
Netherlands  58  3.17  41.6  3.07    0.0 4.05 2.58  41.4  58.6 13.8  55.2  63.8    0.0 
Western Africa  54  2.64  37.4 2.00 24.1  6.28  4.15  79.6  20.4  29.6 11.1 40.7  63.0 
Spanish Speak. Carib. & S. Am.   49  2.76  37.7  2.20    8.2 4.80 3.41  83.7  16.3 16.3  12.2  42.9 67.3 
Czech Republic  48  2.96  46.8 3.02    2.1  3.69  2.51  31.2  68.8    4.2 56.3 91.7  47.9 
Spain  46  2.61  41.3 1.63 17.4  4.07  2.38  37.0  63.0  15.2 43.5 76.1    0.0 
Romania  44  2.48  38.2  2.16    2.3 5.00 3.31  61.4  38.6 36.4  30.0  52.3    0.0 
Ireland  39  2.97  39.3 3.23    0.0  4.82  2.87  23.1  76.9    7.7 61.5 87.2  89.7 
Remaining Southern Asia  39  2.87  39.9 2.62 48.7  5.82  3.62  87.2  12.8  48.7 15.4 69.2  25.6 
Remaining Northern Europe  38  3.32  41.5  3.05    7.9 3.66 2.53  42.1  57.9 10.5  60.5  76.3 10.5 
Algeria  36  2.58  41.9 1.56 58.3  4.17  2.03  47.2  52.8    8.3 36.1 80.6  83.3 
Hungary  34  2.59  41.3 2.62    2.9  4.88  2.82  23.5  76.5    5.9 67.7 88.2  50.0 
Remaining Northern Africa  32  3.03  40.5 3.35 62.5  5.28  3.25  46.9  53.1  18.8 50.0 87.5  50.0 
Western Asia  32  2.80  39.3  2.81  34.4 5.69 3.33  75.0  25.0 50.0    9.4  65.6 15.6 
India  30  3.03  38.1 2.76 53.3  5.77  4.00  46.7  53.3  30.0 26.7 86.7  80.0 
Remaining Eastern Europe  29  2.79  38.5  2.69    0.0 5.83 3.78  72.4  27.6 34.5  17.4  44.8 13.8 
Indonesia  28  3.21  45.1  3.57    0.0 5.11 2.23  35.7  64.3    0.0  57.1  100 96.4 
Norway  26  2.85  44.9 3.19    0.0  3.81  1.92  30.8  69.2    3.9 57.7 61.5  61.5 
Eastern Africa  26  2.46  39.2 2.54 30.8  5.04  3.52  76.9  23.1  30.1 23.1 73.1  38.5 
South-East Asia  26  3.35  37.7 2.31 19.2  6.42  4.29  92.3    7.7  23.1 15.4 61.5  15.4 
United States  24  3.20  42.2  3.56    8.0 5.00 2.98  52.0  48.0 20.0  64.0  56.0 12.0 
Dutch Speak. Carib.& S. Am.  24  2.71  38.0 1.92 12.5  5.50  3.29  62.5  37.5    4.2 25.0  100  100 
Remaining Southern Europe  24  3.09  37.5  2.78    0.0 4.88 3.28  58.3  41.7 20.8  41.7  58.3 37.5 
Brazil  23  2.17  35.3  1.78    0.0 5.87 3.74  95.6    4.4 17.4    8.7  39.1 56.5 
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Switzerland  22  3.00  40.0 3.77    4.6  4.05  2.41  45.4  54.6    9.1 81.8 77.3    0.0 
Angola  21  1.90  40.1  1.90   0.0  5.43  3.69  90.5   9.5   4.8  28.6  66.7  95.2 
East Asia  21  2.95  37.5 3.14 19.1  4.50  2.40  71.4  28.6  19.1 33.3 57.1    4.8 
Pakistan  20  2.21  38.3  1.90  100 6.40 3.73  85.0  15.0 45.0  15.0  70.0 60.0 
Ukraine  20  2.60  41.3  2.85    5.0 4.95 3.48  75.0  25.0 30.0  25.0  45.0    0.0 
Remaining Western Europe  20  2.95  41.8 2.70    0.0  5.40  2.83  40.0  60.0    5.0 60.0 70.0    0.0 
Middle Africa  17  3.41  36.5 4.65 23.5  5.88  3.76  82.3  17.7  17.7 35.3 52.9  23.5 
English Speak. Carib. & S. Am.  15  2.62  38.8 2.47    0.0  6.00  3.57  20.0  80.0    6.7 36.7 93.3  93.3 
Australia and New Zealand  10  3.20  38.7  3.80    0.0 2.80 2.00  70.0  30.0 10.0  60.0  50.0 60.0 
Remaining Northern America  9  3.56  72.8  3.78    0.0 5.89 3.56  66.7  33.3 11.1  33.3  66.7 55.6 
Southern Africa  7  3.29  41.8 3.71 14.3  5.00  3.07  71.2  28.8    0.0 71.4  100  28.6 
French Speaking Caribbean  2  2.00  34.5  0.50   0.0  4.00  3.25  50.0  50.0   0.0   0.0  100  100 
Total  2541  2.69  41.0 2.32 16.7  4.96  3.01  59.9  40.1  25.2 34.2 61.1  23.2 
Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data 
 
* Adapted  ISCED-97 scale 
** This percentage does not include non-religious respondents, but only those who rate themselves as belonging to a non-Christian religion (Islam, Judaism, Eastern religions, other non-Christian religion). 
*** 0= Not at all to 10 = Very religious 
**** How often do you attend religious services apart from special occasions and how often do you pray apart from religious services? 1= Never to 7= Every day
                                                 
i Respondents in France did not indicate the religion they belonged to if they classified themselves as being religious (which 58.7% of natives and 60.1% of the immigrants in France did). For 
natives, we assume that if they are religious, they will belong to a Christian religion, hence the percentage of French natives who belong to a non-Christian religion is estimated to be 0. For 
immigrants who indicated that they belong to a religion, we imputed this religion using information about the country of origin, religiosity, the intensity of religious practice and the educational 
level. 
                                              Table 3 Regression coefficients (exp (b)) of the effects on labour market participation of 
male immigrants and natives, N=7125 
Independent Variables  Model 1  Model 2 Model  3 Model  4 Model  5 Model  6 
Austria  .671** .663** .617** .614** .616**  .668* 
Belgium  .637**     .636** .565*** .570*** .572***  .673* 
Denmark  .472*** .457*** .427*** .429*** .428*** .438*** 
Germany  .445*** .439*** .387*** .393*** .392*** .398*** 
Greece 1.680**  1.652**  1.545* 1.523* 1.495* 1.561* 
Ireland  .775 (n.s.)  .750 (n.s.) .760  (n.s.) .760  (n.s.)  .767 (n.s.)  .785 (n.s.) 
Luxembourg  .529*** .568*** .510*** .506*** .512*** .494*** 
Netherlands  .415*** .411*** .354*** .356*** .357*** .360*** 
Portugal  1.130 (n.s.)  1.092 (n.s.)  1.182 (n.s.)  1.185 (n.s.)  1.212 (n.s.)  1.241 (n.s.) 
Spain  1.927*** 1.859** 1.762** 1.755** 1.769** 1.808** 
Sweden  1.756** 1.748** 1.743** 1.738** 1.741** 1.756** 
United Kingdom  1.264 (n.s.)  1.260 (n.s.)  1.135 (n.s.)  1.155 (n.s.)  1.156 (n.s.)  1.164 (n.s.) 
First Generation Immigrant    .825 (n.s.)  .774* .717** .720**  .798  (n.s.) 
Second  Generation  Immigrant   .755* .752*  .645**  .644**  .763  (n.s.) 
Highest Educational  
Level Achieved     1.209*** 1.205*** 1.227*** 1.277*** 
Highest Level of  
Education Parents     .910*** .907*** .908*** .907*** 
Age     1.432*** 1.434*** 1.434*** 1.439*** 
Age
2     .996*** .996*** .996*** .996*** 
Origin:  Neighbouring  
Country      1.404*  3.102** 3.954** 
Education * Origin.  
Neighb. Country       .761* .705** 
1
st Generation Imm.  
* Dest. Belgium       .264*** 
2
nd Generation Imm.  
* Dest. Austria       .457* 
2
nd Generation Imm.  
* Dest. Greece       .191** 
        
Constant  4.473***  4.700*** .005*** .005*** .004*** .004*** 
-2LogLikelihood  7262.50 7253.50 6928.00 6918.20 6912.94 6879.23 
Source: European Social Survey, 2004 (unweighted data) 
Note: Significant coefficients are marked with * = p < .05, ** = p < .01 and *** = p < .001. 
The effects of the dummies for missing values for education and parents’ education are not included since they are not 
significant. 
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and natives, N=5658 
Independent Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Austria  1.556 (n.s.)  1.614*  1.604 (n.s.)  1.640*  1.409 (n.s.) 
Belgium  1.169 (n.s.)  1.189 (n.s.)  1.265 (n.s.)  1.248(n.s.)  1.245 (n.s.) 
Denmark  1.274 (n.s.)  1.411 (n.s.)  1.720 (n.s.)  1.748*  1.728 (n.s.) 
Germany  2.541*** 2.648*** 3.401*** 3.362*** 3.323*** 
Greece  1.417 (n.s.)  1.478 (n.s.)  1.582  (n.s.) 1.729* 1.931* 
Ireland .747  (n.s.)  .828 (n.s.)  .997 (n.s.)  1.057 (n.s.)  1.055 (n.s.) 
Luxembourg  .395** .302** .318** .316** .302** 
Netherlands  .958  (n.s.)  .989  (n.s.) 1.144  (n.s.) 1.137  (n.s.) 1.117  (n.s.) 
Portugal  1.163 (n.s.)  1.294 (n.s.)  1.006 (n.s.)  1.011 (n.s.)  1.000 (n.s.) 
Spain .738  (n.s.)  .801  (n.s.) .685  (n.s.) .706 (n.s.)  .685 (n.s.) 
Sweden  .587 (n.s.)  .594 (n.s.)  .604 (n.s.)  .617 (n.s.)  .609 (n.s.) 
United Kingdom  1.056 (n.s.)  1.058 (n.s.)  1.157 (n.s.)  1.144 (n.s.)  1.135 (n.s.) 
First  Generation  Immigrant   2.086***  1.624** 2.002*** 2.219*** 
Second  Generation  Immigrant   1.944*** 1.903*** 2.643***  2.170** 
Highest Educational  
Level Achieved     .719*** .721*** .721*** 
Intensity of Religious Practice      1.089*  1.100**  1.108** 
Islam      2.701*** 2.447** 2.549** 
Other  Non-Christian  Religions     5.180** 4.865** 4.681** 
Origin:  Neighbouring  Country     .492**  .535* 
1
st Generation Imm. 
 * Dest. Greece       .324 (n.s.) 
2
nd Generation Imm. 
 * Dest. Austria       3.102* 
       
Constant  .076*** .064*** .088*** .081*** .079*** 
-2LogLikelihood  3046.13 3015.84 2950.30 2942.06 2932.15 
Source: European Social Survey, 2004 (unweighted data) 
Note: Significant coefficients are marked with * = p < .05, ** = p < .01 and *** = p < .001. 
The effects of the dummies for missing values for education and parents’ education are not included since they are not 
significant. 
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occupation of male immigrants and natives, N=5257  
Independent Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Austria  .547 (n.s.)  .611 (n.s.)  1.985*  2.469*  2.444*  2.358* 
Belgium  -.137 (n.s.)  -.003 (n.s.)  -3.592*** -3.596*** -3.615***  -3.594*** 
Denmark  1.260 (n.s.)  1.184 (n.s.)  -5.243***  -5.004***  -5.153***  -5.407*** 
Germany  .255 (n.s.)  .372 (n.s.)  -7.562***  -7.013***  -7.113***  -7.204*** 
Greece -5.306***  -5.054*** -2.818** -2.194* -2.213* -1.640  (n.s.) 
Ireland  -5.079*** -5.071*** -4.147*** -3.970*** -3.855***  -4.188*** 
Luxembourg  -1.492 (n.s.)  -.328 (n.s.)  -1.451 (n.s.)  -2.270*  -2.390*  -2.570* 
Netherlands 3.620**  3.791**  .151  (n.s.)  .249 (n.s.)  .235 (n.s.) .265  (n.s.) 
Portugal  -4.882*** -4.780***  4.560*** 5.065*** 5.381***  5.392*** 
Spain  -3.089**  -2.871**  1.262 (n.s.)  1.584 (n.s.)  1.702 (n.s.)  2.211* 
Sweden  .779 (n.s.)  .909 (n.s.)  -.971 (n.s.)  -.821 (n.s.)  -.756 (n.s.)  -.656 (n.s.) 
United Kingdom  -1.300 (n.s.)  -1.145 (n.s.) -4.039*** -3.507** -3.405**  -3.437** 
First Generation Immigrant    -4.539***  -2.050**  -5.419***  -.678 (n.s.)  .358 (n.s.) 
Second Generation Immigrant    1.719 (n.s.)  1.921*  -2.643*  -2.559*  .287 (n.s.) 
Highest Educational  
Level Achieved     7.619***  7.625***  7.926*** 7.955*** 
Highest Level of  
Education Parents     1.976***  1.996***  2.0248** 2.023*** 
Age      .213*** .208*** .212***  .208*** 
Religiosity      -.233** -.229** -.213**  -.219** 
Origin:  EU15+      6.648***  6.586***  8.101*** 
Origin: North Africa        5.593**  5.378**  4.578* 
Origin:  East  Asia      15.455*  15.009*  16.397* 
Origin: West Asia        4.309*  15.977***  13.985** 
Origin: South-East Asia        7.445*  8.116*  7.407* 
Education  
* 1
st Generation Immigrant        -1.801** -2.233*** 
Education  
* Origin West Asia        -5.134** -4.749** 
1
st Generation Imm.  
* Dest. Greece         -6.504** 
1
st Generation Imm.  
* Dest. Spain         -6.133* 
1
st Generation Imm.  
* Dest. Ireland         8.069* 
1
st Generation Imm.  
* Dest. Denmark         10.674* 
2
nd Generation Imm.  
* Origin EU15+         -5.976** 
          
Constant  46.006*** 46.145*** 13.642*** 13.470*** 12.422***  12.443*** 
Adjusted  R2    .021 .028 .315  .320  .323 .327 
Source: European Social Survey, 2004 (unweighted data) 
Note: Significant coefficients are marked with * = p < .05, ** = p < .01 and *** = p < .001. 
The effects of the dummies for missing values for education and parents’ education are not included since they are not 
significant. 
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class categories of male immigrants and natives, N=5210  
Independent Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Austria  .606*** .615**  .643*** .648** .636**  .675* 
Belgium  .536*** .538***  .247*** .240*** .238***  .254*** 
Denmark  .752 (n.s.)  .754 (n.s.)  .305***  .301***  .299***  .318*** 
Germany  .598*** .612***  .189*** .193*** .193***  .203*** 
Greece .270***  .283***  .232*** .237*** .235*** .270*** 
Ireland  .398*** .403***  .331*** .323*** .317***  .315*** 
Luxembourg  .596***  .682*  .523*** .460*** .455***  .494*** 
Netherlands  .907 (n.s.)  .941 (n.s.)  .563** .566** .560**  .594** 
Portugal .223***  .228***  .534***  .543***  .529**  .563** 
Spain  .420*** .437***  .495*** .496*** .490***  .523*** 
Sweden  .727*  .742*  .537*** .526*** .522***  .603** 
United  Kingdom  .590*** .604***  .362*** .369*** .366***  .385*** 
First  Generation  Immigrant   .569***  .563*** .427*** .423***  .469*** 
Second Generation Immigrant    1.358*  1.476**  .955 (n.s.)  .985 (n.s.)  1.106 (n.s.) 
Highest Educational  
Level Achieved     2.901***  2.911***  2.840*** 2.825*** 
Parental  Education      1.286*** 1.289*** 1.287***  1.296*** 
Age      1.021*** 1.021*** 1.021***  1.021*** 
Origin: EU15+        1.992***  .669 (n.s.)  .475 (n.s.) 
Education * Origin: EU15+          1.451*  1.537* 
1
st Generation Imm.  
* Dest. France        3.238* 
1
st Generation Imm.  
* Dest. Greece        .099* 
1
st Generation Imm.  
* Dest. Ireland        5.284* 
1
st Generation Imm.  
* Dest. Sweden        .350* 
          
Constant  1.283*  1.283*  .020*** .019*** .021***  .020*** 
-2LogLikelihood  6856.730 6818.628  5541.482 5528.011 5522.406  5494.075 
Source: European Social Survey, 2004 (unweighted data) 
Note: Significant coefficients are marked with * = p < .05, ** = p < .01 and *** = p < .001. 
The effects of the dummies for missing values for education and parents’ education are not included since they are not 
significant. 
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female immigrants and natives, N=8313 
Independent Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Austria  .249*** .249***  .288***  .294*** .292*** 
Belgium  .371*** .372***  .338***  .338*** .336*** 
Denmark  .501*** .499***  .439***  .439*** .436*** 
Germany  .273*** .274***  .246***  .245*** .243*** 
Greece .307***  .309***  .386*** .395***  .393*** 
Ireland  .262*** .261***  .319***  .326*** .339*** 
Luxembourg  .170*** .179***  .187***  .182*** .178*** 
Netherlands  .141*** .141***  .133***  .134*** .132*** 
Portugal .460***  .458***  .686**  .715*  .718* 
Spain  .534*** .535***  .619*** .633**  .630** 
Sweden  1.332* 1.341*  1.325*  1.343* 1.327* 
United  Kingdom  .550*** .551***  .551***  .565*** .562*** 
First Generation Immigrant    .838*  .876 (n.s.)  1.990**  1.999** 
Second Generation Immigrant    1.013 (n.s.)  .990 (n.s.)  .997 (n.s.)  1.029 (n.s.) 
Highest Educational  
Level Achieved     1.293***  1.344*** 1.343*** 
Age     1.119***  1.120***  1.120*** 
Age
2     .998***  .998***  .998*** 
Intensity of Religious Practice      1.101***  1.104***  1.106*** 
Islam     .528**  .451**  .445** 
Education  
* 1
st Generation Immigrant       .743*** .757*** 
1
st Generation  
* Destination Ireland        .419* 
         
Constant  2.901*** 2.934*** .143*** .123***  .123*** 
-2LogLikelihood 10847.01  10842.22 10486.26 10467.78  10462.02 
Source: European Social Survey, 2004 (unweighted data) 
Note: Significant coefficients are marked with * = p < .05, ** = p < .01 and *** = p < .001. 
The effects of the dummies for missing values for education and parents’ education are not included since they are not 
significant. 
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immigrants and natives, N=4465 
Independent Variables  Model 1  Model 2 Model  3 Model  4 Model  5 Model  6 
Austria .483**  .481**  .523* .538* .525*  .563  (n.s.) 
Belgium  1.257  (n.s.)  1.274  (n.s.) 1.661* 1.692* 1.766* 1.836* 
Denmark  .766 (n.s.)  .799 (n.s.) .965  (n.s.) .971  (n.s.) .992  (n.s.)  1.050  (n.s.) 
Germany  1.638*  1.667* 2.074*** 2.057***  2.036** 2.179*** 
Greece 1.758**  1.805** .686  (n.s.) .759  (n.s.) .747n.s.)  .761  (n.s.) 
Ireland  .408**  .428** .564  (n.s.) .571 (n.s.)  .576 (n.s.)  .601 (n.s.) 
Luxembourg  .302** .270** .275** .265**  .305*  .338* 
Netherlands .799  (n.s.)  .814  (n.s.) .975  (n.s.) .947  (n.s.)  .933 (n.s.)  .779 (n.s.) 
Portugal  1.440 (n.s.)  1.529*  1.23 (n.s.)  1.232 (n.s.)  1.184 (n.s.)  1.250 (n.s.) 
Spain  .861 (n.s.)  .899 (n.s.) .959  (n.s.) .954  (n.s.) .945  (n.s.)  1.008  (n.s.) 
Sweden  .690 (n.s.)  .697 (n.s.) .730  (n.s.) .748  (n.s.)  .751 (n.s.)  .804 (n.s.) 
United Kingdom  .635 (n.s.)  .639 (n.s.)  .633 (n.s.)  .619 (n.s.) .600*  .658  (n.s.) 
First Generation Immigrant    1.307 (n.s.)  1.256 (n.s.)  1.462*  1.094 (n.s.)  .964 (n.s.) 
Second  Generation  Immigrant   1.530* 1.532*  2.154** 1.646*  1.425  (n.s.) 
Highest Educational  
Level Achieved     .710*** .711*** .694*** .694*** 
Age     .844*** .842***  .843** .841*** 
Age
2     1.002*** 1.002*** 1.002*** 1.002*** 
Roman Catholic      .750*  .753 (n.s.)  .762 (n.s.)  .769 (n.s.) 
Eastern  Orthodox     2.708* .2518* 2.519* 2.611* 
Origin:  Neighbouring  
Countries      .487*  .519* .626  (n.s.) 
Education  
* Origin Former Colony       1.198* 1.108  (n.s.) 
Education  
* Origin East Europe &  
Ex-USSR 
    
1.331* 1.353* 
1
st Generation  
* Dest. Netherlands       5.326** 
2
nd Generation  
* Origin North Africa       3.500* 
        
Constant  .129***  .120*** 11.053** 11.277** 12.009**  11.807* 
-2LogLikelihood  2983.481  2976.822 2903.74 2896.93 2889.29 2878.20 
Source: European Social Survey, 2004 (unweighted data) 
Note: Significant coefficients are marked with * = p < .05, ** = p < .01 and *** = p < .001. 
The effects of the dummies for missing values for education and parents’ education are not included since they are not 
significant. 
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occupation of female immigrants and natives, N=4026 
Independent Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 6 
Austria  1.132  (n.s.)  1.150  (n.s.) 4.084*** 4.667*** 4.476*** 
Belgium  1.164 (n.s.)  1.204 (n.s.)  -2.196 (n.s.)  -2.044 (n.s.)  -2.143 (n.s.) 
Denmark  -.055  (n.s.)  -.179  (n.s.) -6.059*** -5.676*** -5.708*** 
Germany 2.883*  2.993*  -2.217  (n.s.) -1.638  (n.s.) -1.855  (n.s.) 
Greece -3.232*  -3.137*  -.275 (n.s.)  .368 (n.s.) 1.444  (n.s.) 
Ireland  1.839 (n.s.)  1.696 (n.s.)  1.837 (n.s.)  2.233*  2.242* 
Luxembourg  -.608 (n.s.)  .818 (n.s.)  2.556*  2.594 (n.s.)  4.466** 
Netherlands  2.819*  2.872* 1.361  (n.s.) 1.775  (n.s.) 1.560  (n.s.) 
Portugal  -2.699*  -2.928* 6.369*** 6.965*** 7.107*** 
Spain  .474  (n.s.)  .425  (n.s.) 4.520*** 5.012*** 6.278*** 
Sweden  .031 (n.s.)  .182 (n.s.)  -1.705 (n.s.)  -1.332 (n.s.)  -1.637 (n.s.) 
United Kingdom  .055 (n.s.)  .094 (n.s.)  -1.311 (n.s.)  -.808 (n.s.)  -1.003 (n.s.) 
First  Generation  Immigrant    -4.540*** -4.621*** -5.896***  -1.592  (n.s.) 
Second Generation Immigrant    -.702 (n.s.)  -1.423 (n.s.)  -3.596**  -1.424 (n.s.) 
Highest Educational  
Level Achieved     6.6.18***  6.638***  6.598*** 
Highest Level of  
Education Parents     2.047*** 2.113*** 2.138*** 
Parental Education Imputed      -2.427 (n.s.)  -2.458*  -2.715* 
Age     n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Age
2     .001* .001* .001  (n.s.) 
Origin:  EU15+       2.824* 3.922* 
Origin: Eastern Europe  
& Former USSR       -5.972**  5.695 (n.s.) 
Origin: North Africa        9.714**  8.321** 
Origin: West Asia        6.997**  5.915* 
1
st Generation Imm.  
* Dest. Spain        -19.483*** 
1
st Generation Imm.  
* Dest. Greece        -11.484*** 
1
st Generation Imm.  
* Dest. Luxembourg        -9.439*** 
1
st Generation  
* Origin East Europe & Ex-USSR        -14.627** 
1
st Generation  
* Origin Sub-Saharan Africa        -6.307* 
2
nd Generation  
* Origin Neighbouring Cntr.        -5.876** 
        
Constant 44.761***  45.151***  22.085*** 21.410*** 21.488*** 
Adjusted  R2  .010  .015 .254 .259 .272 
Source: European Social Survey, 2004 (unweighted data) 
Note: Significant coefficients are marked with * = p < .05, ** = p < .01 and *** = p < .001. 
The effect of the dummy for missing values on education is not included since it is not significant. 
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categories of female immigrants and natives, N=3978 
Independent Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Austria  .695*  .697* 1.258  (n.s.) 1.265  (n.s.) 1.274  (n.s.) 
Belgium  .955 (n.s.)  .955 (n.s.) .589** .587** .545** 
Denmark  1.232 (n.s.)  1.230 (n.s.)  .700*  .705*  .700* 
Germany  .842 (n.s.)  .848 (n.s.) .516*** .527*** .486*** 
Greece  .339*** .344*** .378*** .384*** .383*** 
Ireland  1.146 (n.s.)  1.140 (n.s.)  1.098 (n.s.)  1.109 (n.s.)  1.104 (n.s.) 
Luxembourg  .771  (n.s.)  .842  (n.s.) 1.055  (n.s.) 1.111  (n.s.) 1.148  (n.s.) 
Netherlands  1.751**  1.762** 1.615* 1.631* 1.631* 
Portugal  .382***  .381*** 1.311  (n.s.) 1.326  (n.s.) 1.322  (n.s.) 
Spain  .785 (n.s.)  .790 (n.s.)  1.078 (n.s.)  1.105 (n.s)  1.101 (n.s.) 
Sweden  .888 (n.s.)  .879 (n.s.)  .744 (n.s.)  .749 (n.s.)  .752 (n.s.) 
United Kingdom  .871 (n.s.)  .872 (n.s.)  .919 (n.s.)  .916 (n.s.) .919  (n.s.) 
First  Generation  Immigrant   .757* .660*  .154**  .138** 
Second Generation Immigrant    .1028 (n.s.)  .924 (n.s.)  1.443 (n.s.)  1.472 (n.s.) 
Highest Educational  
Level Achieved     2.788*** 2.707*** 2.716*** 
Parental  Education     1.237*** 1.253*** 1.260*** 
Age     1.010* 1.009* 1.009* 
Education  
* 1
st Generation Immigrants      1.566*  1.573* 
Education  
* 2
nd Generation Immigrants      .844  (n.s.)  .803* 
1
st Generation Imm.  
* Dest. Belgium       8.505* 
2
nd Generation Imm.  
* Dest. Germany       3.150* 
       
Constant  .947  (n.s.)  .959  (n.s.) .020*** .021*** .021*** 
-2LogLikelihood  5301.336 5296.376 4420.435 4410.375 4398.341 
Source: European Social Survey, 2004 (unweighted data) 
Note: Significant coefficients are marked with * = p < .05, ** = p < .01 and *** = p < .001. 
The effects of the dummies for missing values for education and parents’ education are not included since they are not 
significant. 
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N= 7152 
Independent Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Austria  -.157* -.156*  -.364***  -.362***  -.364*** -.366*** 
Belgium  .377***  .382***  .114 (n.s.)  .117 (n.s.)  .121* .121* 
Denmark  .556***  .551***  .113 (n.s.)  .117 (n.s.)  .120 (n.s.)  .127* 
Germany  .680*** .683*** .214*** .224*** .225*** .220*** 
Greece  -.040 (n.s.)  -.031 (n.s.)  .073 (n.s.)  .061 (n.s.)  .055 (n.s.)  .122* 
Ireland  -.050 (n.s.)  -.051 (n.s.)  -.178**  -.182**  -.190** -.184** 
Luxembourg  .086 (n.s.)  .133*  -.109 (n.s.)  -.089 (n.s.)  -.081 (n.s.)  -.001 (n.s.) 
Netherlands  .403*** .409***  .175**  .168**  .164** .168** 
Portugal  -.921*** -.919*** -.901*** -.915*** -.936*** -.926*** 
Spain  -.309*** -.303*** -.351*** -.355*** -.363*** -.365*** 
Sweden  .156*  .161**  -.037 (n.s.)  -.037 (n.s.)  -.047 (n.s.)  -.045 (n.s.) 
United Kingdom  .259***  .265**  -.023 (n.s.)  -.041 (n.s.)  -.042 (n.s.)  -.047 (n.s.) 
First Generation Immigrant   -.177***  -.077  (n.s.) -.201*** -.415*** -.389*** 
Second Generation Immigrant    .050 (n.s.)  .053 (n.s.)  -.076 (n.s.)  -.060 (n.s.)  .024 (n.s.) 
Parents’ Educational Level      .248***  .244***  .234*** .236*** 
Parents Educational Level Imputed     -.291***  -.295***  -.305*** -.302*** 
Age     .021*  .021*  .021* .021* 
Age
2     .000**  .000**  .000** .000** 
Roman Catholic     .175***  .173***  .170*** .179*** 
Protestant     .174***  .172***  .173*** .181*** 
Other Christian Religion     .279***  .272***  .267*** .258*** 
Islam     -.172*  -.146  (n.s.)  -.120 (n.s.)  -.095 (n.s.) 
Intensity of Religious Practice     .019*  .019*  .020* .022** 
Origin: Neighbouring Country      .195**  .171** .062  (n.s.) 
Origin: Sub-Saharan Africa      .427**  1.058*** 1.164*** 
Origin: South Asia      .329*  .304* .307* 
Origin: South-East Asia      .456*  .423* .369  (n.s.) 
Parents’ Education  
* 1
st Generation Imm. 
    
.102*** .080*** 
Parents’ Education  
* Origin Sub-Saharan Africa       -.229*** -.251*** 
1
st Generation Imm.  
* Dest. Luxembourg 
    
 -.271** 
1
st Generation Imm.  
* Dest. Greece 
    
 -.497** 
1
st Generation Imm.  
* Origin Neighbouring Cntr.       .322** 
1
st Generation Imm.  
* Origin Former Colony       .191  (n.s.) 
1
st Generation Imm.  
* Origin Eastern Europe & Ex-USSR       .380* 
2
nd Generation Imm.  
* Dest. Greece 
    
 -.480* 
2
nd Generation Imm.  
* Dest. Portugal 
    
 -1.208** 
        
Constant  2.609*** 2.616*** 1.793*** 1.808*** 1.853*** 1.798*** 
R2  .129 .131 .267 .269 .271 .275 
Source: European Social Survey, 2004 (unweighted data) 
Note: Significant coefficients are marked with * = p < .05, ** = p < .01 and *** = p < .001. 
The effect of the dummy for missing values on education is not included since it is not significant. 
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natives, N=8362 
Independent Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Austria  -.441*** -.440*** -.546*** -.546*** -.546*** -.555*** 
Belgium .332***  .323***  .090 (n.s.)  .091 (n.s.)  .094 (n.s.)  .084 (n.s.) 
Denmark  .488***  .491***  -.011 (n.s.)  -.012 (n.s.)  -.004 (n.s.)  -.015 (n.s.) 
Germany  .370***  .373***  -.108*  -.108*  -.091 (n.s.)  -.102 (n.s.) 
Greece -.279***  -.275*** -.107* -.109* -.113* -.132* 
Ireland  .004 (n.s.)  .008 (n.s.)  -.048 (n.s.)  -.050 (n.s.)  -.053 (n.s.)  -.066 (n.s.) 
Luxembourg  -.278*** -.278*** -.419*** -.417*** -.404*** -.319*** 
Netherlands  .118*  .121*  -.052 (n.s.)  -.052 (n.s.)  -.052 (n.s.)  -.064 (n.s.) 
Portugal  -1.112***  -1.107*** -.957*** -.959*** -.967*** -.960*** 
Spain  -.414*** -.409*** -.357*** -.359*** -.364*** -.388*** 
Sweden .197**  .199**  .053  (n.s.)  .054 (n.s.)  .054 (n.s.)  .036 (n.s.) 
United Kingdom  .010 (n.s.)  .011 (n.s.)  -.295***  -.297***  -.299***  -.344*** 
First Generation Immigrant    -.005 (n.s.)  .007 (n.s.)  .001 (n.s.)  -.192**  -.113 (n.s.) 
Second Generation Immigrant    .050 (n.s.)  -.003 (n.s.)  -.010 (n.s.)  .001 (n.s.)  -.060 (n.s.) 
Parents’ Educational Level       .274***  .273***  .262***  .262*** 
Parents Educational  
Level Imputed     -.212***  -.212***  -.211*** -.222*** 
Age     .031** .031** .031**  .032*** 
Age
2     -.001*** -.001*** -.001*** -.001*** 
Roman  Catholic     .152*** .153*** .149*** .145*** 
Protestant     .269*** .268*** .269*** .269*** 
Islam     -.494*** -.493*** -.466*** -.543*** 
Jewish     .706* .709* .706* .735* 
Other Christian Religion      .181**  .181**  .186**  .183** 
Intensity of Religious Practice      .019**  .019**  .019**  .019** 
Origin: North America        .426*  .336 (n.s.)  .380 (n.s.) 
Parents’ Education  
* 1
st Generation Imm.       .091*** .060** 
Parents’ Education  
* Origin East Europe & Ex-USSR       -.071* -.060* 
1
st Generation Imm.  
* Dest. UK       .321* 
1
st Generation Imm.  
* Dest. Luxembourg       -.296** 
1
st Generation Imm.  
* Dest. France       -.359* 
1
st Generation Imm.  
* Dest. Portugal       -.432* 
1
st Generation Imm.  
* Origin Neighbouring Cntr.       .168* 
1
st Generation Imm.  
* Origin South-East Asia       .480* 
2
nd Generation Imm.  
* Dest. Spain       .816* 
2
nd Generation Imm.  
* Origin North Africa       .473* 
2
nd Generation Imm.  
* Origin South Asia       .606* 
        
Constant  2.718*** 2.713*** 1.748*** 1.753*** 1.786*** 1.785*** 
R2  .143 .143 .313 .313 .315 .318 
Source: European Social Survey, 2004 (unweighted data) 
Note: Significant coefficients are marked with * = p < .05, ** = p < .01 and *** = p < .001. 
The effect of the dummy for missing values on education is not included since it is not significant. 
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EUI-WP RSCAS 2007/19 © 2007 Fenella Fleischmann and Jaap Dronkers                                                 49Table 13 Macro-characteristics in the five multi-level regressions of male immigrants: Coefficients, standard errors and improvement in model 
fit 
 
   Labour market  
participation 
Unemployment Occupational  status 
(ISEI) 
High EGP  Education 
Destination  EII: Labour market inclusion  -0.356 (0.257) 2.10  -0.120 (0.447) 4.091  0.645 (3.044) 0.045  0.104 (0.582) 2.070  0.134 (0.134) 0.954 
Effects  EII: Long-term residence rights  -0.339 (0.347) 0.76  0.022 (0.537) 0.279  -2.531 (3.913) 0.417  -0.572 (0.714) -17.753  0.077 (0.174) 0.181 
  EII: Family reunification  -0.190 (0.357) 0.37  0.016 (0.559) 0.275  -3.643 (3.942) 0.837  -0.463 (0.742) -7.419  0.269 (0.170) 2.279 
  EII: Naturalization  -0.569 (0.465) 6.23  0.575 (0.915) 1.003  2.692 (4.843) 0.272  1.406 (0.867) 30.204  0.548 (0.190) 6.644 
  EII: Anti-Discrimination  -0.262 (0.173) 1.19  -0.043 (0.303) 3.277  1.774 (2.049) 0.717  0.324 (0.402) 21.338  0.133 (0.094) 1.767 
  EII: Total index score  -0.490 (0.342) 2.43  -0.016 (0.551) 0.443  0.515 (3.828) 0.018  0.211 (0.727) 6.486  0.260 (0.165) 2.284 
  Liberal welfare regime  -0.260 (0.478) 0.01  0.126 (0.799) -1.928  5.011 (5.049) 0.852  1.832 (0.745) 9.866  0.325 (0.110) 7.381 
  Social-democratic welfare regime  0.489 (0.294) 1.88  -0.391 (0.481) 10.607  3.173 (2.883) 1.170  -0.219 (0.561) 4.458  0.070 (0.132) 0.271 
  Conservative welfare regime  -0.542 (0.250) 8.68  0.297 (0.303) 16.866  -2.753 (2.795) 0.917  -0.199 (0.509) -1.666  -0.170 (0.089) 3.002 
  Southern welfare regime  0.314 (0.345) 2.29  -0.258 (0.399) 4.143  -2.906 (3.525) 0.577  0.570 (0.750) -1.921  -0.166 (0.154) 1.137 
  Employment Protection Legislation  0.136 (0.212) 0.65  0.261 (0.281) -5.908  -3.918 (1.657) 4.409  -0.766 (0.306) 27.868  -0.100 (0.058) 2.760 
  Size of the bottom of the labour market  0.027 (0.023) 0.01  0.029 (0.035) 4.576  0.234 (0.320) 0.422  0.003 (0.050) 0.035  0.018 (0.009) 2.902 
  GDP per capita in 1000 ppp  0.000 (0.010) 0.01  0.012 (0.020) 10.481  0.101 (0.133) 0.550  0.027 (0.030) -17.211  0.005 (0.006) 0.786 
  GINI coefficient  0.031 (0.026) 7.98  -0.030 (0.038) 8.517  0.012 (0.311) 0.001  0.030 (0.056) 19.052  0.013 (0.012) 1.118 
  Presence of Left-wing parties in government  -0.002 (0.035) 0.02  -0.026 (0.036) -0.262  -0.307 (0.254) 1.376  -0.014 (0.044) 32.342  -0.010 (0.012) 0.750 
  Net migration rate  0.000 (0.032) 0.02  0.042 (0.064) 9.561  -0.051 (0.437) 0.014  0.040 (0.083) -15.491  0.008 (0.019) 0.150 
            
Origin  GDP per capita in 1000 ppp  0.001 (0.008) 0.01  -0.033 (0.014) 17.909  0.192 (0.055) 11.839  0.018 (0.008) 1.595  0.000 (0.002) 0.007 
Effects GINI  coefficient  0.003 (0.005) 0.20  -0.015 (0.009) 13.117  0.032 (0.038) 0.714  -0.001 (0.006) 0.018  -0.002 (0.002) 1.200 
  Net migration rate  -0.059 (0.029) 13.27  -0.020 (0.051) 4.971  0.152 (0.224) 0.456  -0.002 (0.005) 3.526  0.002 (0.001) 1.082 
  Political stability  -0.019 (0.011) 3.65  -0.333 (0.156) 102.461  -0.041 (0.102) 0.163  -0.009 (0.005) 18.178  0.000 (0.002) 0.098 
  Political freedom  -0.018 (0.005) 21.86  0.019 (0.010) 11.287  -0.058 (0.043) 1.791  0.011 (0.008) 6.556  -0.001 (0.002) 0.082 
  Civil rights  -0.004 (0.011) 0.62  0.008 (0.025) 2.667  -0.089 (0.90) 0.978  -0.200 (0.074) 3.073  -0.020 (0.024) 0.680 
  Status of political freedom  0.038 (0.027) 0.01  0.030 (0.032) 11.498  -0.263 (0.145) 2.134  -0.011 (0.027) 0.112  -0.006 (0.010) 0.385 
  Human Development Index  0.001 (0.002) 0.42  0.008 (0.003) 15.156  -0.028 (0.016) 3.074  -0.001 (0.002) -6.102  0.001 (0.001) 0.817  
  Prevalently Christian country  0.009 (0.190) 0.01  -0.358 (0.320) 4.303  1.665 (1.411) 1.340  0.267 (0.235) -8.718  -0.002 (0.081) 0.001 
  Prevalently Eastern-Orthodox country  0.045 (0.314) 0.13  0.242  (0.458) 0.736 - 5.865 (2.228) 6.684  -0.600 (0.411) 6.972  -0.129 (0.128) 0.985 
  Prevalently Islamic country  -0.179 (0.232) 0.01  -0.172 (0.369) -3.622  -0.435 (1.731) 0.062  -0.327 (0.300) -12.012  0.016 (0.097) 0.027 
Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data 
Note: Every cell contains the following information: the size of the coefficient is printed in bold letters; standard errors are given in brackets, while the gain in  -2 LogLikelihood that results from 
including the specific indicator is given in italics. Table 14 Coefficients (and standard errors) of the multi-level logistic regression of labour market participation of male immigrants  
N=1188 (table continues on following page) 
  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10 

































































































































































































































Education * One native, one immigrant 
parent 











Education * Speaking minority 
language at home 






















                                                Table 14 continued 
  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10 








Destination: Conservative welfare 
regime 




































Origin:  Neighbouring  countries        0.248 
(0.200) 
 
Origin:  Former  colony/territory        0.085 
(0.222) 
 




          
















































          
-2LogLikelihood 1338.67  1202.69  1203.06 1190.15 1167.49 1155.75 1137.81 1139.62 
Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data. Table 15 Coefficients (and standard errors) of the multi-level logistic regression of unemployment of male immigrants,  
N=799 (table continues on next page) 
  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10 
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parent 












Education * Speaking minority 
language at home 























                                                Table 15 (continued) 
  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10 
Destination: Social-Democratic 
Welfare Regime 







Destination: Conservative Welfare 
Regime 







Destination: GDP per capita in 1000 
ppp 




























Origin:  EU15+        0.328 
(0.725) 
 




Origin:  Former  colony/territory        -0.055 
(0.392) 
 
Origin:  Post-socialist  countries        0.698 
(0.506) 
 
          
















































          
-2LogLikelihood 120.117  11.541  -42.7346  -60.2713 -132.611 -152.51  -120.198 1.536 
Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data. Table 16 Coefficients (and standard errors) of the multi-level regression of current occupational status (ISEI) of male immigrants,  
N=799 (table continues on following page) 
  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10 

































































































































































































































Education * One native, one immigrant 
parent 











Education * Speaking Minority 
language at home 






















                                                Table 16 (continued) 
  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10 
Employment Protection Legislation        -3.895 
(1.670) 



























Origin:  EU15+        0.362 
(2.428) 
 
Origin:  Neighbouring  countries        1.716 
(1.303) 
 
Origin:  Former  colony/territory        1.648 
(1.389) 
 





































































          
-2LogLikelihood 6687.651  6454.947  6445.348 6440.966 6434.200 6429.868 6409.321 6438.884 
Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data. Table 17 Coefficients (and standard errors) of the multi-level logistic regression of reaching one of the higher EGP class categories of male 
immigrants, N=799 (table continues on following page) 
  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10 
































































































































































































































Education * One native, one immigrant 
parent 











Education * Speaking minority 
language at home 






















                                                Table 17 (continued) 
  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10 
EII: Naturalization Policy        1.780 
(0.691) 






Employment Protection Legislation        -0.782 
(0.314) 






Destination: Presence of left-wing 
parties in government 














Origin: Prevalently Eastern Orthodox 
countries 







Origin:  EU15+        0.076 
(0.345) 
 
Origin:  Neighbouring  countries        -0.032 
(0.251) 
 
Origin:  Former  colony/territory        -0.121 
(0.272) 
 




          
















































          
-2LogLikelihood 1001.22  696.942  678.112 576.586 649.929 554.139 561.371 652.828 
Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data. Table 18 Coefficients (and standard errors) of the multi-level regression of highest level of education of male immigrants, N=1188 
  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10 





































































































































































































Parental education * One native, one 
immigrant parent 











Parental education * Speaking 
Minority language at home 








































                                               Table 18 (continued) 
  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10 






















Origin:  EU15+        -0.052 
(0.119) 
 
Origin:  Neighbouring  countries        0.092 
(0.095) 
 
Origin:  Former  colony/territory        0.037 
(0.100) 
 
Origin:  Post-socialist  countries        -0.103 
(0.108) 
 

































































          
-2LogLikelihood 3412.956  3206.288  3200.872 3188.099 3198.777 3185.569 3183.502 3202.425 
Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data. Table 19 Macro-characteristics in the five multi-level regressions of female immigrants:  
Coefficients, standard errors and improvement in model fit 
   Labour market 
participation 
Unemployment Occupational  status 
(ISEI) 
High EGP  Education 
Destination  EII: Labour market inclusion  -0.251 (0.207) 3.960  0.297 (0.505) -0.090  -1.035 (2.914) 0.126  0.229 (0.369) 39.897  -0.016 (0.152) 0.011 
Effects  EII: Long-term residence rights  -0.091 (0.296) 5.230  1.058 (0.676) 9.295  1.427 (3.501) 0.163  0.340 (0.423) 27.069  -0.129 (0.185) 0.478 
  EII: Family reunification  -0.329 (0.284) 3.710  1.361 (0.849) 21.245  1.693 (3.694) 0.210  0.087 (0.445) 9.168  -0.081 (0.195) 0.172 
  EII: Naturalization  -0.184 (0.317) 0.250  -0.090 (0.820) 0.317  3.467 (4.655) 0.535  0.297 (0.587) 28.910  0.196 (0.236) 0.681 
  EII: Anti-Discrimination  -0.224 (0.142) 6.390  0.226 (0.370) -2.153  1.998 (2.029) 0.951  0.316 (0.237) 95.180  0.050 (0.104) 0.222 
  EII: Total index score  -0.368 (0.278) 4.400  0.660 (0.679) 1.515  1.898 (3.575) 0.279  0.402 (0.442) 60.478  0.009 (0.189) 0.003 
  Liberal welfare regime  -0.255 (0.296) 1.300  -0.592 (1.149) 4.958  2.188 (4.325) 0.252  0.483 (0.542) 10.335  0.261 (0.127) 3.881 
  Social-democratic welfare regime  -0.365 (0.260) 5.540  -5.296 (2.434) 128.108  0.239 (2.890) 0.007  -0.299 (0.301) -0.811  0.008 (0.157) 0.003 
  Conservative welfare regime  -0.124 (0.158) 0.000  0.304 (0.435) 5.335  4.834 (2.489) 3.585  0.341 (0.250) -27.642  -0.154 (0.085) 2.581 
  Southern welfare regime  0.459 (0.187) 10.320  0.295 (0.447) 1.947  -8.190 (2.448) 8.421  -0.795 (0.460) -41.841  0.021 (0.170) 0.015 
  Employment Protection Legislation  0.238 (0.130) 6.260  0.686 (0.405) 22.641  -3.034 (1.638) 2.958   -0.467 (0.238) 31.772  -0.060 (0.066) 0.800 
  Size of the bottom of the labour market  0.006 (0.015) 0.680  -0.060 (0.042) 8.727  -0.302 (0.250) 1.380  -0.063 (0.026) -62.346  0.014 (0.011) 1.464 
  GDP per capita in 1000 ppp  -0.010 (0..007) 1.970  -0.035 (0.021) 2.504  0.159 (0.150) 1.066  -0.021 (0.021) 20.871  -0.001 (0.007) 0.046 
  GINI coefficient  0.030 (0.017) 4.540  0.090 (0.041) 21.646  0.060 (0.330) 0.033  0.024 (0.037) 5.611  0.016 (0.012) 1.684 
  Presence of Left-wing parties in government  0.034 (0.019) 5.510  0.005 (0.056) -0.485.  -0.134 (0.305) 0.191  -0.042 (0.036) 41.400  0.005 (0.013) 0.155 
  Net migration rate  -0.009 (0.029) 0.010  -0.143 (0.082) -5.022  -0.032 (0.529) 0.004  -0.063 (0.051) 36.339  0.004 (0.022) 0.035 
          
Origin  GDP per capita in 1000 ppp  -0.012 (0.006) 7.280  -0.045 (0.016) 62.619  0.031 (0.060) 0.265  -0.002 (0.009) 0.053  0.008 (0.003) 6.591 
Effects GINI  coefficient  0.026 (0.005) 40.490  -0.002 (0.013) 1.159  0.004 (0.054) 0.005  0.003 (0.007) -4.745  0.002 (0.002) 0.861 
  Net migration rate  0.000 (0.025) -2.290  0.015 (0.058) 0.362  -0.062 (0.247) 0.063  0.022 (0.010) 189.153  0.021 (0.011) 3.420 
  Political stability  -0.008 (0.007) -0.016  -0.462 (0.169) 166.716  0.004 (0.081) 0.003  0.006 (0.006) -19.106  -0.001 (0.003) 0.037 
  Political freedom  -0.029 (0.005) 43.800  0.001 (0.015) 0.326  -0.054 (0.069) 0.621  -0.013 (0.010) 17.377  0.001 (0.002) 0.052 
  Civil rights  -0.042 (0.012) 22.410  -0.186 (0.088) 84.001  -0.106 (0.147) 0.506  -0.042 (0.077) 8.917  0.001 (0.004) 0.092 
  Status of political freedom  -0.041 (0.040) -0.175  -0.144 (0.151) 18.329  0.152 (0.437) 0.120  -0.047 (0.123) 1.212  -0.022 (0.018) 1.622 
  Human Development Index  0.001 (0.003) -2.780  0.009 (0.004) 25.474  0.009 (0.018) 0.250  -0.001 (0.003) 14.622  -0.002 (0.001) 6.780 
  Prevalently Christian country  -9.081 (0.181) -2.060  -0.661 (0.344) 21.728  -0.118 (1.556) 0.006  0.085 (0.246) -1.217  0.091 (0.075) 1.470 
  Prevalently Eastern-Orthodox country  -0.131 (0.221) -2.620  0.539 (0.500) 8.811  -3.621 (2.437) 2.077  -0.333 (0.412) -30.448  0.113 (0.108) 1.077 
  Prevalently Islamic country  -0.041 (0.211) -2.080  1.070 (0.369) 26.874  2.010 (2.067) 0.933  0.061 (0.336) -1.011  -0.298 (0.099) 8.856 
Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data. 
Note: Every cell contains the following information: the size of the coefficient is printed in bold letters; standard errors are given in brackets, while the gain in -
2LogLikelihood that results from including the specific indicator is given in italics.
                                               Table 20 Coefficients (and standard errors) of the multi-level logistic regression of labour market participation of female immigrants,  
N=1285 (table continues on next page) 
  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10 

















































































































































































































































Education * Citizenship of the 
destination country 


















 Table 20 (continued) 
  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10 







Destination: Employment Protection 
Legislation 






























Origin:  EU15+        0.287 
(0.282) 
 
Origin:  Neighbouring  countries        -0.268 
(0.167) 
 
Origin:  Former  colony/territory        0.240 
(0.178) 
 
Origin:  Post-socialist  countries        0.087 
(0.209) 
 
          
















































          
-2LogLikelihood 1750.45  1675.41  1661.21 1644.65 1603.08 1595.64 1595.66 1629.85 
Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data. 
                                             Table 21 Coefficients (and standard errors) of the multi-level logistic regression of unemployment of female immigrants,  
N=564 (table continues on following page) 
  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10 









































































































































































































































Education * Citizenship of the 
destination country 

















 Table 21 (continued) 
  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10 
Destination: Social-democratic welfare 
regime 








Destination: Employment Protection 
Legislation 











































Origin:  EU15+        0.241 
(0.835) 
 
Origin:  Neighbouring  countries        -0.312 
(0.459) 
 
Origin:  Former  colony/territory        0.128 
(0.434) 
 
Origin:  Post-socialist  countries        1.013 
(0.524) 
 
           
















































           
-2LogLikelihood  110.195 26.7176 25.2529 -84.2354 -121.435 -180.577 -200.365  -68.8765 
Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data. 
                                                Table 22 Coefficients (and standard errors) of the multi-level regression of current occupational status (ISEI) of female immigrants  
N=564 (table continues on following page) 
  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10 











































































































































































































































Education * Citizenship of the 
destination country 











Destination: Conservative welfare 
regime 







(1.507) Table 22 (continued) 
  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10 















Origin: Prevalently Eastern Orthodox 
countries 







Origin:  EU15+        1.778 
(2.212) 
 
Origin:  Neighbouring  countries        -2.577 
(1.734) 
 
Origin:  Former  colony/territory        1.442 
(1.668) 
 
Origin:  Post-socialist  countries        -1.321 
(2.197) 
 

































































          
-2LogLikelihood 4821.321  4636.586  4633.484 4622.299 4631.407 4620.141 4615.927 4637.638 
Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data. 
                                                Table 23 Coefficients (and standard errors) of the multi-level logistic regression of reaching one of the highest EGP class categories of female 
immigrants, N=564 (table continues on next page) 
  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10 











































































































































































































































Education * Citizenship of the 
destination country 

















 Table 23 (continued) 
  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10 
Destination: Presence of left-wing 
parties in government 





































Origin:  EU15+        -0.472 
(0.406) 
 
Origin:  Neighbouring  countries        0.183 
(0.285) 
 
Origin:  Former  colony/territory        0.091 
(0.277) 
 
Origin:  Post-socialist  countries        -0.465 
(0.363) 
 
           
















































           
-2LogLikelihood 765.958  668.536  763.414 646.627 574.772 510.604 505.209  564.185 
Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data. 
                                                Table 24 Coefficients (and standard errors) of the multi-level regression of highest level of education of female immigrants,  
N=1285 (table continues on next page) 
  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10 







































































































































































































Parental education * 2
nd generation 
immigrants 












Parental education * Citizenship of the 
destination country 


















Destination: Conservative welfare 
regime 













 Table 24 (continued) 
  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10 





























Origin:  EU15+        -0.176 
(0.140) 
 
Origin:  Neighbouring  countries        -0.058 
(0.091) 
 
Origin:  Former  colony/territory        -0.062 
(0.093) 
 
Origin:  Post-socialist  countries        -0.157 
(0.115) 
 

































































          
-2LogLikelihood 3732.779  3392.761  3387.077 3382.276 3373.949 3369.402 3365.444 3393.915 
Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data. 
                                                Figure 1 Differences in labour market participation between male and female natives and 
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Figure 2 Differences in unemployment between male and female natives and immigrants in 
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Figure 4 Differences in reaching the highest EGP class categories of male and female natives 
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Austria Switzerland,  Liechtenstein, Italy, Germany, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, 
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Belgium  France, The Netherlands, Germany, Luxembourg, United Kingdom 
Germany  Denmark, Poland, Czech Republic, Austria, Switzerland, France, Luxembourg, Belgium, 
The Netherlands, United Kingdom 
Denmark  Germany, Sweden, Norway, United Kingdom 
Spain  Portugal, France, Morocco 
Finland  Sweden, Norway, Russian Federation, Estonia 
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United Kingdom  Ireland, Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany, France, Denmark, Norway 
Greece  Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Cyprus 
Ireland United  Kingdom 
Luxembourg  Belgium, Germany, France 
The Netherlands  Belgium, Germany, United Kingdom 
Portugal Spain 
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  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11 
1 Christian  1            
2 Islamic  -.571**  1          
3 Eastern Orthodox  -.278**  -.169 1         
4 Other non-Christian  -.373**  -.226**  -.110 1        
5 GDP per capita  .373**  -.291**  -.055  -.109 1       
6 GINI coefficient  .032  .104 -.266**  .077 -.378**  1         
7 Net migration rate  -.025 -.049 -.060 .144 .271**  -.119  1       
8 Political stability  .368** -.318**  -.052  -.062  .649** -.337**  -.014  1     
9 Human Development 
Index  -.378** .341** -.091  .149  -.818** .427**  -.266**  -.670**  1   
10 Political rights  -.521** .526** -.052    .089  -.681** .252** -.086  .617**  .725**  1  
11 Civil rights  -.518** .508** -.061  .116  -.723** .281** -.102  .653**  .741** .969**  1 
12 Political freedom  -.523** .520** -.049  .100  -.633**  .212* -.092  .594**  .691** .977** .960** 
                                                Table III Correlation (Pearson’s R) between the macro-indicators of the countries of destination, N=13 
  1 2 3 4 5 6  7  8  9  10  11 12  13  14 
1 EII: Labour market inclusion  1                           
2 EII: Long-term residence  .705**  1                         
3  EII:  Family  reunification  .654*  .842**  1                  
4  EII:  Naturalization  .551  .555*  .698**  1                
5  EII:  Anti-Discrimination  .850**  .577*  .674*  .524  1              
6  EII:  Total  .913**  .846**  .875**  .716**  .891**  1             
7 Liberal Welfare Regime  -.030  -.260  -.072  .296  .130  -.001  1               
8 Social-Democratic Welfare Regime  -.171  -.154  -.273  -.441  -.118  -.232  -.182  1             
9 Conservative Welfare Regime  -.056  .248  .244  .095  -.105  .066  -.395  -.395  1           
10 Southern Welfare Regime  .238  .062  .007  .011  .114  .121  -.234  -.234  -.507  1         
11  EPL  .210 .432 .342 -.024 .054 .232  -.840**  -.041  .170  .564  1       
12 GDP per capita  -.427  -.465  -.289  .134  -.473  -.408  .132  .014  .324  -.508  -.666**  1     
13 GINI coefficient  .044  .050  .210  .175  .263  .164  .467  -.322  -.480  .444  -.076  -.567*  1   
14 Net migration rate  -.493  -.566*  -.354  .045  -.549  -.493  .128  -.164  .279  -.299  -.647*  .935**  -.413  1 
15 Presence of Left-Wing Parties in Government  -.210  .226  -.017  -.196  -.183  -.089  -.433  .398  -.164  .224  .514  -.234  -.010  -.252 
 Table IV Variance components of the multilevel models for male immigrants  
with random effects 





with the  
intercept 





Labour market   Intercept  0.000 (0.000)  n.a.  0.000 (0.000)  n.a. 
participation  2
nd Generation  /  /  0.144 (0.155)  0.000 (0.000) 
  One native, one  
immigrant parent 
0.099 (0.113)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) 
  Minority language  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) 
  Citizenship  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) 
  Education /  /  0.052  (0.058)  -0.167 
(0.168) 
Unemployment  Intercept  0.000 (0.000)  n.a.  0.000 (0.000)  n.a. 
  2
nd Generation  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.0000)  0.000 (0.000) 
  One native, one  
immigrant parent 
0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) 
  Minority language  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  Does not converge  n.a. 
  Citizenship  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) 
  Education /  /  /  / 
ISEI  Intercept  0.000 (0.000  n.a.  0.000 (0.000)  n.a. 
  2
nd Generation  /  /  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) 
  One native, one  
immigrant parent 
/  /  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) 
  Minority language  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) 
  Citizenship  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) 
  Education /  /  /  / 
High EGP  Intercept  0.063 (0.067)  n.a.  0.000 (0.000)   n.a. 
  2
nd Generation  0.000 (0.000  0.000 (0.000)  /  / 
  One native,  
one immigrant parent 
0.000 (0.000  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000  0.000 (0.000) 
  Minority language  0.000 (0.000  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000  0.000 (0.000) 
  Citizenship  0.000 (0.000  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000  0.000 (0.000) 
  Education /  /  /  / 
Education  Intercept  0.000 (0.000)  n.a.  0.053 (0.021)  n.a. 
  2
nd Generation  0.003 (0.011)  0.000 (0.000)  0.160 (0.066)  -0.160 
(0.051) 
  One native, one  
immigrant parent 
0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) 
  Minority language  /  /  0.112 (0.082)  0.047 (0.028) 
  Citizenship 0.077  (0.051)  -0.055 (0.036) 0.053  (0.055)  -0.109 
(0.052) 
  Parental education  0.000 (0.000  0.000 (0.000)  /  / 
Note: In a number of cases, models did not converge after randomization. These are indicated with a bar, since no estimates 
of the variance components are available in these cases. 
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with random effects 
 Randomized   
indicator 
Country of  
Destination 
Covariance 
with the  
intercept 
Country of  
Origin 
Covariance  
with the  
intercept 
Labour market  Intercept  0.000 (0.000)  n.a.  0.000 (0.000)  n.a. 
participation  2
nd Generation  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)   0.000 (0.000) 
  One native, one  
immigrant parent 
0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)   0.000 (0.000) 
  Minority language  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.317 (0.269)  0.000 (0.000) 
  Citizenship  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)   0.000 (0.000) 
  Education  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  /  / 
Unemployment  Intercept  0.000 (0.000)  n.a.  0.000 (0.000)  n.a. 
  2
nd Generation  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)   0.000 (0.000) 
  One native, one  
immigrant parent 
0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)   0.000 (0.000) 
  Minority language  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)   0.000 (0.000) 
  Citizenship  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  /  / 
  Education  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)   0.000 (0.000) 
ISEI  Intercept  0.000 (0.000)  n.a.  1.609 (5.504)  n.a. 
  2
nd Generation  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  /  / 
  One native, one  
immigrant parent 
5.272 (7.037)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)   0.000 (0.000) 
  Minority language  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)   0.000 (0.000) 
  Citizenship  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)   0.000 (0.000) 
  Education  / / / / 
High EGP  Intercept  0.000 (0.000)  n.a.  0.000 (0.000)  n.a. 
  2
nd  Generation  / / / / 
  One native, one  
immigrant parent 
0.227 (0.269)  0.000 (0.000)  /  / 
  Minority language  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)   0.000 (0.000) 
  Citizenship  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)   0.000 (0.000) 
  Education  / / / / 
Education  Intercept  0.004 (0.007)  n.a.  0.062 (0.021)  n.a. 
  2
nd Generation  0.006 (0.017)  0.002 (0.009)  0.095 (0.055)  -0.099 (0.040) 
  One native, one  
immigrant parent 
0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)   0.000 (0.000) 
  Minority language  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)   0.000 (0.000) 
  Citizenship /  /  0.016  (0.043)  -0.070  (0.042) 
  Parental Education  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.012 (0.005)  -0.056 (0.018) 
Note: In a number of cases, models did not converge after randomization. These are indicated with a bar, since no estimates 
of the variance components are available in these cases. 
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